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PETITIONING A COURT TO MODIFY ALIMONY WHEN 
A CLIENT RETIRES 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The belief that marriage is a lifelong union is fast becoming an 
antiquated notion as approximately fifty percent of all marriages 
end in divorce. l Accordingly, the area of family law has expanded to 
encompass the ever-changing situations of divorcing couples,2 vary-
ing moral standards, and a society loathe to address the emotional 
and economic fallout produced by divorce.3 As a result of the many 
1. See Susan Hager, Comment, Nostalgic Attempts to Recapture What Neuer Was: Loui-
sianas Covenant Marriage Act, 77 NEB. L. REv. 567, 567 (1998); see also HUGH 
CARTER & PAUL C. GLICK, MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE: A SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC 
STUDY 28 (1976). However, the assumption that the weakening of marital 
bonds is a product of the changing family ideals of the twentieth century is 
not completely accurate. See JACQUELINE D. STANLEY. DIVORCES FROM HELL 11 
(1995). In the seventeenth century, King Henry VIII of England established a 
new religion to obtain a divorce from his first wife, Catherine of Aragon. See 
id. at 19. In addition, Abraham Lincoln handled divorce cases as a routine 
part of his law practice before becoming President of the United States. See ill. 
at 70. In one particular case, Lincoln was believed to have carried his client 
into the courtroom on his shoulders, declaring: "Unless my client gets both 
mules and the good pitchfork, all the thunder of the heavens will descend 
upon you in a manner that no human being has ever been witnessed to." Id. 
2. See generaUy WALTER O. WEYRAUCH & SANFORD N. KATZ. AMERICAN FAMILY LAw IN 
TRANsmON (1983) (providing an in-depth perspective on the theory of family 
law). 
3. The new burden on society is incited largely by the intense chain of events 
preceding divorce and the resulting adverse impact on the parties involved. 
See Paul Bohannan, The Six Stations of Divorce, in READINGS IN FAMILY LAw: DI-
VORCE AND ITS CoNSEQUENCES 4 (Frederica K. Lombard ed., 1990). According 
to Bohannan, there are six stages of divorce that transpire simultaneously and 
complicate the daily social routines of couples. See ill. These six overlapping 
experiences are: 
(1) the emotional divorce, which centers around the problem of the 
deteriora-ting marriage; (2) the legal divorce, based on grounds; (3) 
. the economic divorce, which deals with money and property; (4) the 
coparental divorce, which deals with custody, single-parent homes, 
and visitation; (5) the community divorce, surrounding the changes 
of friends and community that every divorcee experiences; and (6) 
the psychic divorce, with the problem of regaining individual 
autonomy. 
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distinctions in family morals and values, divorce-" [t] he legal sepa-
ration of man and wife, effected by the judgment or decree of a 
court,"4--can no longer be considered a simple legal matter. 
One aspect of divorce proceedings that has been the subject of 
much debate and discussion is alimony.5 Specifically, the issue of 
terminating or modifying an alimony award has become the subject 
of scrutiny in numerous jurisdictions.6 The focus of this Comment is 
on modifying alimony awards in Maryland. 
Initially, this Comment addresses the historical development of 
alimony in Maryland by examining its origin from the practices of 
[d. at 4-5. 
4. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 480 (6th ed. 1990). 
5. See Robert F. Kelly & Greer Litton Foxh, Determinants of Alimony Awards: An Em-
pirical Test of Certain Theories and a Reflection of Public Policy, 44 SYRACUSE L REv. 
641, 642-43 (1993) (questioning the lack of scholarly literature addressing ali-
mony, despite recent legal discussion); John C. Sheldon, The Sleepwalker's TOUT 
of Divorr:e Law, 48 ME. L REv. 7, 26 n.56 (1996) (listing recent scholarly discus-
sions underlying a "furious and nation-wide debate" of alimony). Alimony is 
derived from the Latin word alimonia, which means sustenance and it typically 
defined as a "court-ordered allowance one spouse pays to support his or her 
estranged spouse." Me First, 8 FAM. Anvoc. 3, 3 (1986). When alimony was first 
awarded by the English ecclesiastical courts, the husband was ordered to make 
support payments to the wife, but the parties actually remained married dur-
ing the course of their lives. See Ira Mark Ellman, The Theory of Alimony, 77 
CAL. L REv. 3, 5 (1989). 
6. See infra Parts III and IV for a general discussion of decisions affecting the 
post-separation termination or inodiflc;nion of alimony. 
The distinction between the terms "alimony" and "spousal support" is rela-
tively unimportant in Maryland today. The traditional definition of alimony in-
volved a court order demanding payments from a husband to a wife to con-
tinue as long as they live separate and apart, and for the joint lives of the 
parties. See Mendelson v. Mendelson, 75 Md. App. 486, 496, 541 A.2d 1331, 
1336 (1988). Violation of this order could subject the non<ompliant party to 
contempt and the accompanying possibility of jail time or other sanctions. See 
id. at 497,541 A.2d at 1336. Spousal support, on the other hand, was tradition-
ally viewed as a creature of contract, which a court could not grant but for an 
agreement of some sort between the parties. See id. Non<ompliance with 
agreements of this sort had typically subjected the party only to civil penalties 
for breach of contract. See id. The distinction has historically been of conse-
quence because courts that found that an element of technical alimony was 
missing from a factual situation, even though the parties intended for the pay-
ments to constitute alimony, would nonetheless have been required to treat 
the payments as being pursuant to an agreement of spousal support, and thus 
not enforceable or modifiable by the courts. See id. at 497, 541 A.2d at 
1336-37. 
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the English ecclesiastical courts in the eighteenth century' to its 
present treatment.8 The historical development includes a brief dis-
cussion of the purpose of alimony,9 the three categories of alimony 
that Maryland courts are presently authorized to grant,IO and the es-
sential elements required for an award under each. I I Parts Three 
and Four of this Comment explain the circumstances that permit 
courts to modify alimony awards,12 as well as the rare situations that 
have been found sufficient to terminate alimony.13 One of the most 
common situations in which a court will modify an alimony award is 
when a payor spouse retires. 14 To that end, a major focus of this 
Comment is a comparative analysis of various jurisdiction's treat-
ment of retirement as it relates to modifying alimony. 
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF ALIMONY IN MARYLAND 
In England, prior to the eighteenth century, the ecclesiastical 
courts did not have the power. to completely dissolve a marriage by 
granting an absolute divorce. 15 However, the ecclesiastical courts did 
have the power to order a legal separation of a couple through a 
limited divorce. I.6 The ecclesiastical courts had the authority to grant 
7. For a general overview of the historical development of alimony, see Chester 
G. Vernier & John B. Hurlbut, The Historical Background of Alimony Law and its 
Present Statutory Strnctu1l1, 6 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 197 (1939); infra notes 
15-36 and accompanying text. 
8. See, e.g., Horsey v. Horsey, 329 Md. 392,410, 620 A.2d 305, 314-15 (1993) ("'AI-
imony' in a legal sense (often referred to as 'technical alimony') is a periodic 
allowance for spousal support, payable under judicial decree, which terminates 
upon the death of either spouse or upon the remarriage of the spouse receiv-
ing the payments or upon the reconciliation and cohabitation of the par-
ties."). 
9. See infra notes 41-60 and accompanying text. 
10. See infra notes 61-80 and accompanying text. 
11. See infra notes 61-80 and accompanying text. 
12. See infra notes 81-257 and accompanying text. 
13. See infra notes 258-82 and accompanying text. 
14. See infra notes 81-257 and accompanying text. 
15. See Thomas v. Thomas, 294 Md. 605, 609-10, 451 A.2d 1215,1217 (1982) (foot-
note omitted). An absolute divorce, often referred to as "a vinculo ma-
trimonii"-from the bed of matrimony-is a type of divorce that results in a 
complete dissolution of the marriage contract. BlACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 136 
(6th ed. 1990); see also MD. CODE ANN .. FAM. LAw § 7-103 (1998) (providing the 
grounds for an absolute divorce in Maryland). 
16. A limited divorce is a "judicial separation of husband and wife not dissolving 
the marriage." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 927 (6th ed. 1990); see also MD. CODE 
ANN .. FAM. lAw § 7-102 (providing the grounds for a limited divorce in Mary-
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alimony, but only to the wife and only when a limited divorce was 
granted. 17 Thus, the ecclesiastical courts could not grant alimony to 
a wife that sought support if she was not divorcing her husband. IS 
In Maryland, ecclesiastical courts did not exist. 19 Parties seeking 
to dissolve their marriage could not get relief from Maryland's judi-
ciary because divorce "was deemed exclusively a legislative func-
tion. "20 Thus, the General Assembly retained exclusive authority to 
grant divorces in Maryland.21 Though the ecclesiastical alimony doc-
trine that limited the circumstances in which a court could grant an 
alimony award was adopted through decisional law in many jurisdic-
tions,22 it was not fully embraced by Maryland COUrts.23 Instead, Ma-
ryland equity courts assumed broader inherent authority and 
granted alimony to wives that received a limited divorce through 
the legislature, as weU as to wives that did not even seek a divorce.24 
In 1777, in an apparent attempt to restrict this inherent power, 
"the General Assembly authorized equity courts to hear and deter-
mine alimony causes in the same manner" as the English ecclesiasti-
land). 
17. See Thomas, 294 Md. at 609-10,451 A2d at 1217. 
18. See McAlear v. McAlear, 298 Md. 320, 327, 469 A2d 1256, 1259 (1984). 
19. See Thomas, 294 Md. at 610, 451 A.2d at 1217. 
20. Id. (citing Crane v. Meginnis, 1 G. & J. 463, 474 (1829»; see also McAlear, 298 
Md. at 327, 469 A.2d at 1259 (observing that "[d]ivorce in Maryland is a statu-
tory creation that was unknown to the common law"); Bender v. Bender, 282 
Md. 525,529, 386 A2d 772, 775 (1978); Altman v. Altman, 282 Md. 483, 490, 
386 A2d 766, 770 (1978); Emerson v. Emerson, 120 Md. 584, 589, 87 A 1033, 
1035 (1913). 
21. See McAlear, 298 Md. at 328, 469 A2d at 1259. 
22. See Courson v. Courson, 213 Md. 183, 185, 129 A2d 917, 918 (1957). 
23. See Thomas, 294 Md. at 610, 451 A2d at 1217; Courson, 213 Md. at 185, 129 
A2d at 918. Several other cases have examined the history of divorce and ali-
mony in England and in Maryland. See, e.g., Bender, 282 Md. at 529-31, 386 
A2d at 775-77; Altman, 282 Md. at 490-91,386 A2d at 770-71; Foote v. Foote, 
190 Md. 171, 176-80, 57 A2d 804, 807-09 (1948). 
24. See McAlear, 298 Md. at 328, 469 A2d at 1260 (citing Galwith v. Galwith, 4 H. & 
McH. 477, 478 (1689»; Emerson, 120 Md. at 590, 87 A at 1035-36 (noting that 
the "right" to alimony "was founded on the common-law obligation of the 
husband to support his wife"). 
For example, in Galwith v. Galwith, 4 H. & McH. 477 (1689), scandalous 
rumors arose about Mrs. Galwith; her husband evicted her and their child 
from the family's home. See id. Mrs. Galwith did not seek a divorce decree, but 
instead sought an order requiring her husband to pay her maintenance if he 
was not ordered to allow her back into the home. See id. at 477-78. The court 
ordered Mr. Galwith to provide a specified amount of his tobacco crop each 
year if he did not allow her to move back into the family's home. See id. 
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cal courts.2S Nevertheless, courts construed this statute "as merely 
confirming the previously existing inherent authority of Maryland 
equity courts over alimony."26 Thus, Maryland courts continued to 
grant alimony awards to wives without requiring a limited divorce.27 
Although Maryland courts took greater liberties in awarding ali-
mony than their ecclesiastical counterparts, Maryland courts still 
viewed alimony as a right incident to marriage.28 Inasmuch as a lim-
ited divorce did not sever the parties' marital bond,29 Maryland 
courts would only grant alimony "to be paid during the term of the 
marriage. "30 
A major change occurred in 1841, when the General Assembly 
greatly expanded the power of the courts to grant alimony after the 
marriage was terminated.31 Maryland equity courts were empowered 
by the General Assembly to grant both limited and absolute di-
vorces, along with the authority to grant an award of alimony to the 
wife in either type of divorce proceeding.32 This power was subse-
quently codified in sections 24 and 25 of Article 16 of the Maryland 
Annotated Code.33 In 1975, the General Assembly broadened the ju-
dicial power to grant alimony.34 Article 16, section 1 (a) "authorized 
equity courts ... to award alimony to either spouse."3S Further-
25. McAlear, 298 Md. at 328, 469 A.2d at 1260. Alimony awards wer~ only granted 
to the wife. See id. 
26. [d. 
27. See, e.g., Galwith, 4 H. & McH. at 478. 
28. SeeJOHN F. FADER, II & RICHARD J. GILBERT, MARYlAND FAMILY lAw § 4-1(c), at 
116 (2d ed. 1995). 
29. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
30. See FADER & GILBERT, supra note 28, § 4-1 (c), at 116. 
31. See id. 
32. See Thomas v. Thomas, 294 Md. 605, 609-14, 451 A.2d 1215, 1217-20 (citing MD. 
ANN. CoDE art. 16, §§ 24 and 25 (1957»; see also Mendelson v. Mendelson, 75 
Md. App. 486, 495, 541 A.2d 1331, 1336 (1988) ("[T]he traditional definition 
of alimony was court ordered payments to a wife .... "); Bebermeyer v. 
Bebermeyer, 241 Md. 72, 76-77, 215 A.2d 463, 466 (1965); Blades v. Szatai, 151 
Md. 644, 648, 135 A. 841, 843 (1927); Hood v. Hood, 138 Md. 355, 360, 113 A. 
895, 897 (1921); Newbold v. Newbold, 133 Md. 170, 174-75, 104 A. 366, 367 
(1918); McCaddin v. McCaddin, 116 Md. 567, 571, 82 A 554, 556 (1911); Wal-
lingsford v. Wallingsford, 6 H & J 485, 488 (1825). 
33. See McAlear v. McAlear, 298 Md. 320, 330, 469 A.2d 1256, 1261 (1984). 
34. See id. The code sections, which provided an amended and expanded version 
of the statute, were repealed in 1984. See MD. ANN. CoDE art. 16, §§ 1-5 (1982). 
35. McAlear, 298 Md. at 330, 469 A.2d at 1261. While article 16 broadened the 
power of a court to award alimony, it somewhat restricted the court's discre-
tion by requiring courts to consider "an enumerated set of factors" before 
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more, section 5(a) "confirmed the authority of equity courts to 
modify the amount of alimony awarded. "36 
Maryland's current alimony statute37 was enacted by the Gen-
eral Assembly in 1980.38 Courts are now supplied with a multi-factor 
framework to use in determining the amount and duration of an al-
imony award.39 When a party seeks to modify an alimony award by 
either extending the payment period or adjusting the amount of 
the award, section 11-107 of the Family Law Article sets forth stan-
dards that the party seeking relief must meet.40 The next section of 
this Comment demonstrates that these statutory provisions repre-
sent a philosophical departure from prior approaches to alimony. 
A. The Purpose of Alimony 
The fundamental purpose of alimony has been the subject of 
considerable debate.41 Maryland alimony payments were initially 
awarded on an indefinite basis, allowing the husband and wife to 
live separate and apart without eliminating the husband's obligation 
to support his wife.42 In essence, alimony represented a continua-
tion of the socioeconomic aspect of the legal bond of marriage for 
the duration of the couple's joint lives.43 Alimony awards embodied 
both the continuing legal duty of a husband to support his wife and 
the lack of employment opportunity for women.44 
rendering an award. ld. 
36. ld. 
37. See MD. CoDE ANN., FAM. LAw §§ 11-101 to 11-111 (1998) (originaJly codified as 
MD. ANN. CODE art. 16 §§ 1, 2, 3, 5 (Supp. 1980». 
38. See Blaine v. Blaine, 336 Md. 49, 63, 646 A.2d 413, 420 (1994). 
39. See MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 11-106 (1998). 
40. See ilL § 11-107. 
41. See HOMER H. ClARK. JR.. THE LAw OF DOMESTIC RElATIONS IN THE UNITED 
STATES § 14.1, at 421 (1968). For example, a few articulated purposes of ali-
mony include continuing the support that the financially dependant spouse 
was entitled to receive while the marriage was in existence, punishment for 
the payor spouse's transgressions, and damages for wrongful breach of the 
marriage contract. See ill. at 421-22. 
42. See Knabe v. Knabe, 176 Md. 606, 611, 6 A.2d 366, 369 (1939). 
43. See Dougherty v. Dougherty, 187 Md. 21, 32,48 A2d 451, 457 (1946); Michael 
D. Smith, Note, The Duration of the Alimony Obligation in Wyoming: Longer Than 
We Both ShaU Liver Oedekoven v. Oedekoven, 920 P.2d 649 (Wyo. 1996), 33 
LAND & WATER L. REv. 383, 384-85 (1998) (citing HOMER H. ClARK. JR.. THE 
LAw OF DOMESTIC RElATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES. § 16.1, at 619 (2d ed. abr. 
1988». 
44. See Smith, supra note 43, at 384-85 (1998) (citing ClARK. supra note 43, § 16.1, 
at 619). 
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As time passed, however, alimony award amounts were increas-
ingly based on the wife's level of need, the standard of living estab-
lished during the course of the marriage,45 and the assumption that 
the wife would not become self-sufficient. 46 Although these consider-
ations increasingly shaped the amount of alimony awarded, courts 
continued to provide indefinite, periodic support for the financially 
dependent wife following the divorce without encouraging her to 
become self-sufficient in the future.47 
For example, in Dougherty v. Dougherty,48 a wife appealed a di-
vorce decree that denied her request for alimony on the grounds of 
abandonment.49 The Court of Appeals of Maryland emphasized that 
in applying for alimony, a wife was not "asking for favors but de-
manding rights. "50 The court found that the wife was entitled to ali-
mony based on the husband and wife's financial circumstances, sta-
45. See Timanus v. Timanus, 178 Md. 640, 642-43, 16 A.2d 918, 920 (1940). In 
Timanus, the wife was living with a married daughter at the time of the hear-
ing, paying five dollars per week for rent and sleeping in the living room on a 
cot. See id. at 642, 16 A.2d at 919. Her former husband, an attorney, lived 
alone in an eight-bedroom house. See id. at 643, 16 A.2d at 920. The court 
concluded, based on a comparison of the former couple's situation, that the 
wife was entitled to demand support from her husband under the applicable 
law. See id. The court looked at the parties' standard of living and affirmed the 
award of alimony to the wife based largely in part on the wife's need and the 
husband's earning capacity. See id. at 644, 16 A.2d at 920. 
46. See Linda D. Elrod, The Widening Door of Alimony, 8 FAM. ADVOCATE, 4, 4-5 
(1986). 
47. See infra notes 48-52 and accompanying text. Traditionally, alimony has been 
regarded as "a money allowance payable under a judicial decree by a husband 
at stated intervals to his wife, or former wife, during their joint lives or until 
the remarriage of the wife, so long as they live separately, for her support and 
maintenance." Knabe, 176 Md. at 612,6 A.2d at 368-69. 
48. 187 Md. 21, 48 A.2d 451 (1946). 
49. See id. at 25, 48 A.2d at 454. At trial, the husband established that his wife's 
adulterous relationships had led to their divorce. See id. at 28, 48 A.2d at 455. 
50. ld. at 33, 48 A.2d at 457; cf. Condore v. Prince George's County, 289 Md. 516, 
520, 425 A.2d 1011, 1013 (1981) (citing Ewell v. State, 207 Md. 288, 114 A.2d 
66 (1955); Coastal Tank Lines, Inc. v. Canoles, 207 Md. 37, 113, 521 A.2d 82 
(1955); Stonesifer v. Shriver, 100 Md. 24, 59 A. 139 (1904» ("Under the com-
mon law of Maryland, prior to the adoption of ERA, the husband had a legal 
duty to supply his wife with necessaries suitable to their station in life, but the 
wife had no corresponding obligation to support her husband, or supply him 
with necessaries, even if she had the financial means to do so."). Alimony also 
proved to be a valuable tool for an ex-husband who wished to control his for-
mer wife's behavior after the dissolution of the marriage. See Jana B. Singer, 
DWorce Refurm and Gender Justice, 67 N.C. L. REv. 1103, 1109-10 (1989). 
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tion in life, age, physical condition, ability to work, length of time 
together, circumstances leading to their separation, and the hus-
band's earning capacity.51 Although the Dougherty court discussed a 
variety of factors that Maryland courts were just beginning to de-
velop, the opinion remained true to the prevailing view that the pri-
mary purpose of alimony was for the wife's "support during the 
joint lives of the parties as long as they [remained] separated. "52 
Mod~rn courts began to de-emphasize the idea that alimony 
was an entitlement by shifting to the rationale that the purpose of 
alimony should be to rehabilitate the wife so that she may ulti-
mately become self-sufficient.53 Consistent with this rehabilitative 
purpose, alimony evolved to encompass gender neutral54 support 
obligations that are awarded for a pre-determined period of time.55 
Nevertheless, the financial independence that rehabilitative ali-
mony56 is designed to provide may be difficult to take advantage of 
when a dependent spouse is left alone with children and is forced 
to become self-sufficient while struggling to care for the familyY 
51. See Dougherty, 187 Md. at 33, 48 A.2d at 457. 
52. Id. at 32, 48 A.2d at 457 ("Under the law of this State no allowance to a wife is 
considered as alimony which does anything more than provide for the pay-
ment of money at stated periods for her support during the joint lives of the 
parties as long as they are separated."). 
53. See Holston v. Holston, 58 Md. App. 308, 321, 473 A.2d 459, 465 (1984). The 
main purpose of alimony is "to rehabilitate the dependant spouse so she or 
he may become economically self-5ufficient." Rogers v. Rogers, 80 Md. App. 
575, 591, 565 A.2d 361, 369 (1989) (citations omitted); see also Quigley v. 
Quigley, 54 Md. App. 45, 54, 456 A.2d 1305, 1311 (1983) (noting that the Gov-
ernor's Commission report clearly stated that the primary purpose of alimony 
was to provide the recipient with the opportunity to become self-5ufficient), 
uverruled on other grounds, Parker v. Robins, 68 Md. App. 597, 514 A.2d 1237 
(1986). 
54. See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
55. See FADER & GILBERT. supra note 28, § 4-3, at 119. 
56. Rehabilitative alimony is defined as "sums necessary to assist a divorced person 
in regaining a useful and constructive role in society through vocational or 
therapeutic training or retraining and for the further purpose of preventing 
financial hardship on society or [the] individual during the rehabilitative pro-
cess." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1287 (6th ed. 1990) (citing Sever v. Sever, 467 
So. 2d 492, 494 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985». 
57. See generaUy RlANE TENNENHAUS EISLER, DISSOLUTION: No FAULT DIVORCE. MAR. 
RlAGE. AND THE FUTURE OF WOMEN 54 (1977). Data indicative of the first year 
after divorce has shown that men enjoy a 42% increase in their standard of 
living, while women and children suffer a 73% decline. See Cynthia Starnes, 
Divorce and the Displaced Homemaker. A Discourse on Playing with Dolls, Partnership 
Buyouts and Dissociation Under NtrFault, 60 U. CHI. L. REv. 67. 79 (1993) (citing 
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While Maryland courts are still permitted to grant indefinite ali· 
mony awards,s8 the state has recognized and accepted rehabilitation 
as alimony's primary purpose,S9 replacing the traditional belief that 
LENORE]' WEITZMAN. THE DIVORCE REvOLUTION 323 (1985». Starnes provided a 
concise overview of the situation as it existed a few years ago, declaring that 
"[w]hen a woman whose principal job has been homemaking loses her occu· 
pation and her patriarch, she faces a sea-change in both income and status." 
Id. at 78. 
58. See Tracey v. Tracey, 328 Md. 380, 393-94, 614 A2d 590, 596-97 (1992) (hold· 
ing that a gross disparity existed when recipient's income was 28% of the 
payor's and that recipient would not automatically forfeit her right to alimony 
should she engage in additional part-time work), cere. granted, 325 Md. 551, 
60 1 A.2d 1114 (1992), rescinded on other grounds, 328 Md. 380, 614 A2d 590 
(1992); Blaine v. Blaine, 97 Md. App. 689, 708, 632 A2d 191, 201 (1993) (find-
ing that because the recipient spouse's income was equal to 22.7% of the 
payor's income, it was sufficient to support an award of indefinite alimony); 
Rock v. Rock, 86 Md. App. 598, 609-11, 587 A2d 1133, 1138 (1991) (deferring 
to the lower court's decision to award indefinite alimony based on the fact 
that the recipient spouse did not have the skills or professional opportunities 
to earn more than 21.7% of the payor spouse's income); Broseus v. Broseus, 
82 Md. App. 183, 196, 570 A.2d 874, 880-81 (1990) (upholding the lower 
court's grant of indefinite alimony to recipient spouse whose earnings were 
equal to 34.9% of the payor spouse); Rogers, 80 Md. App. at 591-92, 565 A2d 
at 369-70 (noting that a gross disparity in income existed when the payor 
spouse's annual income exceeded $100,000 and the payee, a full-time student 
whose income was pure conjecture, had never earned more than $17,500); 
Bricker v. Bricker, 78 Md. App. 570, 577, 554 A2d 444, 447 (1988) (finding 
that even when the recipient spouse maximized her income by working exces-
sive hours, the recipient'S income was only 35% of that earned by the payor 
spouse and therefore, finding an award of indefinite alimony proper); Holston, 
58 Md. App. at 322-23, 473 A2d at 466 (observing that even if the recipient 
spouse were able to re-enter the job market after 15 years, her earnings would 
be less than 15% of the payor spouse's); Kennedy v. Kennedy, 55 Md. App. 
299, 306-07, 462 A2d 1208, 1214 (1983) (upholding the trial court's finding 
that 34% difference in incomes resulted in unconscionably disparate standards 
of living, justifying an indefinite alimony award); see also Strauss v. Strauss, 101 
Md. App. 490, 512, 647 A2d 818, 829 (1994) (holding that the trial court 
abused its discretion in only basing the award of indefinite alimony on the re-
cipient spouse's "expressed needs and her ability to meet those needs" with· 
out considering the parties' respective lifestyles); Melrod v. Melrod, 83 Md. 
App. 180, 195-97, 574 A.2d 1, 8-9 (1990) (finding that despite a short mar· 
riage, the disparity in income was so great that an award of indefinite alimony 
was not an abuse of discretion). 
59. See Doser v. Doser, 106 Md. App. 329, 352, 664 A2d 453, 464 (1995) (empha· 
sizing that fixed·term rehabilitative alimony, is "clearly preferred to indefinite 
alimony"); see also Tracey, 328 Md. at 391, 614 A2d at 596 (observing that the 
statutory scheme generally favors fixed-term or rehabilitative alimony which 
provides an opportunity for the recipient spouse to become self-supporting); 
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alimony was to serve as a "lifetime pension. "60 
B. Categories oj Alimony in Maryland 
Maryland courts are now vested with the power to grant awards 
of alimony.61 Under section 11-101 (c) of the Maryland Family Law 
Rock, 86 Md. App. at 609, 587 A.2d at 1138 (justifying the award of indefinite 
alimony because rehabilitative spousal support for a limited time would result 
in a gross inequity); Blake v. Blake, 81 Md. App. 712, 727, 596 A2d 724, 731 
(1990) (noting that although rehabilitative alimony has become the preferred 
legislative award, the trial judge was we\l suited to determine whether, given 
the time necessary to achieve further education or training, a 57 year-old 
spouse would be able to become self-supporting or was statutorily qualified to 
receive indefinite alimony); EWgers, 80 Md. App. at 591, 565 A.2d at 369 (de-
claring that the primary purpose of alimony is to be rehabilitative, as opposed 
to punitive or compensatory, so that the dependent spouse can become finan-
cia\ly independent); Bricker, 78 Md. App. at 580, 554 A2d at 449 (observing 
that the statutory preference for rehabilitative alimony dates back to a recom-
mendation by the Governor's Commission on Domestic Relations Laws); Tur-
risi v. Sanzaro, 308 Md. 515, 530, 520 A.2d 1080, 1087-88 (1987) (acknowledg-
ing that while the General Assembly has embraced the concept of 
rehabilitative alimony, a trial court may reserve the right to award alimony in 
a case when one spouse was suffering from multiple sclerosis, even though 
that spouse was presently self-supporting); Rosenberg v. Rosenberg, 64 Md. 
App. 487, 536,497 A2d 485, 510 (1984) (concluding that although the princi-
pal function of alimony is rehabilitation, the lower court could find that the 
recipient spouse would never become sufficiently self-supporting to a\low her 
to continue the lifestyle she shared with her husband of thirty years). But cJ. 
Covie\lo v. Covie\lo, 91 Md. App. 638, 652, 605 A2d 661, 668 (1992) (noting 
that if supported by the evidence, and within the purposes of the statute, si-
multaneous awards of rehabilitative and indefinite alimony are permissible). 
60. Holston, 58 Md. App. at 321, 473 A2d at 465-66. In Holston, the court of spe-
cial appeals noted: 
[T]he concept of alimony as a lifetime pension enabling the finan-
cia\ly dependent spouse to maintain an accustomed standard of liv-
ing has largely been superseded by the concept that the economica\ly 
dependent spouse should be required to become self-supporting, 
even though that might result in a reduced standard of living. 
[d. (citing the Governor's Commission on Domestic Relations Laws, Report on 
a Proposal Bill Relating to Alimony and Comment on a Proposed Bill Relating 
to the Decriminalization of Non-support, Beverly Anne Grover, Chairman, Jan. 
18, 1980). More recently, the court of special appeals reiterated this standard 
in Jensen v. Jensen, 103 Md. App. 678, 692-93, 654 A2d 914, 921 (1995) and 
Campolattaro v. Campolattaro, 66 Md. App. 68, 75, 502 A2d 1068, 1072 (1986). 
For an enlightening discussion of alimony awards, see Charles J. Aldrich, 
Comment, The Spousal Support Scheme in Ohio Under 3105:18: Trial Courts Have 
Too Much Judicial Discretion, 22 OHIO N.V. L REv. 815 (1996). 
61. See MD. CODE ANN .• FAM. LAw § 1-20l(a)(2) (1998). 
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Article, an alimony award may be granted to an individual who is 
entitled to an annulment,62 limited divorce,63 or absolute divorce.64 
There are three categories of alimony that may be awarded in Mary-
land: (1) temporary alimony,65 (2) statutory alimony,66 and (3)indef-
62. See id. § 11-101 (a)(2)(i) "An 'annulment' differs from a divorce in that a di-
vorce terminates a legal status, whereas an annulment establishes that a mari-
tal status never existed." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 91 (6th ed. 1990) (citing 
Whealton v. Whealton, 432 P.2d 979 (Cal. 1967». 
63. See MD. CODE ANN .. FAM. LAw § 11-101 (a)(2)(ii). 
64. See id. § 11-101 (a)(2)(iii). 
65. See id. § 11-102. Temporary alimony, or alimony pendente lite, is a form of ali-
mony intended to temporarily stabilize the financial situation of a dependant 
spouse through the preliminary steps of a divorce proceeding. See Guarino v. 
Guarino, 112 Md. App. I, 10,684 A.2d 23, 27-28 (1996) (citing Speropulos v. 
Speropulos, 97 Md. App. 613, 617, 631 A.2d 514,516 (1993». Alimony pendente 
lite is defined as "[a]n allowance made pending a suit for divorce or separate 
maintenance including a reasonable allowance for preparation of the suit as 
well as for support." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 47 (6th ed. 1990). 
66. Underlying statutory alimony is the legislative intent to "change the focus of 
alimony from a form of lifetime pension toward a 'bridge' to self-sufficiency." 
Jensen v. Jensen, 103 Md. App. 678, 693, 654 A.2d 914, 921 (1994); see also 
FADER & GILBERT, supra note 28, § 4-7, at 142 (referring to alimony awarded 
under MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 11-106(b) as "statutory alimony"). Section 
11-106(b) of the Maryland Family Law Article provides the following twelve 
factors for a court to. consider in determining the amount of an alimony 
award: 
(I) the ability of the party seeking alimony to be wholly or partly self 
supporting; (2) the time necessary for the party seeking alimony to 
gain sufficient education or training to enable that party to find suit-
able employment; (3) the standard of living that the parties estab-
lished during their marriage; (4) the duration of the marriage; (5) 
the contributions, monetary and nonmonetary, of each party to the 
well-being of the family; (6) the circumstances that contributed to 
the estrangement of the parties; (7) the age of each party; (8) the 
physical and mental condition of each party; (9) the ability of the 
party from whom alimony is sought to meet that party's needs while 
meeting the needs of the party seeking alimony; (10) any agreement 
between the parties; (II) the financial needs and financial resources 
of each party, including: (i) all income and assets, including property 
that does not produce income; (ii) any award made under §§ 8-205 
and 8-208 of this article; (iii) the nature and amount of the financial 
obligations of each party; and (iv) the right of each party to receive 
retirement benefits; and (12) whether the award would cause a 
spouse who is a resident of a related institution as defined in § 19-
301 of the Health-General Article and from whom alimony is sought 
to become eligible for medical assistance earlier than would other-
wise occur. 
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inite alimony.67 
MD. CODE ANN .. FAM. LAw § 11-106(b). Maryland courts have applied these fac-
tors in a number of cases. See, e.g., Tracey v. Tracey, 328 Md. 380, 387-90, 614 
A2d 590, 594-96 (1992) (holding that income includes wages or salary from 
regular, full-time employment, not income from a second job), cm. granted, 
325 Md. 551, 601 A.2d 1114 (1992), rescinded on other grounds, 328 Md. 380, 614 
A2d 590 (1992); Rock v. Rock, 86 Md. App. 598, 605, 587 A2d 1133, 1137 
(1991) (acknowledging that the Legislature made the circumstances contribut-
ing to the estrangement a factor in granting alimony in lieu of the relatively 
modern common law doctrine which precluded spousal support where the 
one seeking support was at fault); Alston v. Alston, 85 Md. App. 176, 189-90, 
582 A2d 574, 58~81 (1990) (affirming the trial court's finding that the recipi-
ent's non-economic contributions, such as taking care of the children, prepar-
ing meals, and maintaining a clean home, far exceeded the payor's contribu-
tions), mJ'd on other grounds, 331 Md. 496, 629 A.2d 70 (1991); Blake v. Blake, 
81 Md. App. 712, 728-29, 569 A2d 724, 732 (1990) (finding that the trial 
judge was well suited to permit indefinite alimony when the evidence showed 
that the 57-year-old recipient spouse had a difficult time getting her present 
job and did not think that, given her age, she would return to school or be 
able to compete for jobs against younger people); Rogers v. Rogers, 80 Md. 
App. 575, 59~92, 565 A.2d 361, 369 (1989) (determining that even if the re-
cipient spouse were to earn a college degree while receiving alimony, there 
would be no reason to expect that the respective standard of living of the par-
ties would not be unconscionably disparate); Benkin v. Benkin, 71 Md. App. 
191, 203, 524 A.2d 789, 794-95 (1987) (holding that the trial court should 
have explained why a women who suffers from a longstanding arthritic condi-
tion should not be eligible for indefinite alimony given the difficulty she will 
likely experience in attempting to re-enter the job market). However, condi-
tions aside from these factors may affect a court's alimony award. See Reuter v. 
Reuter, 102 Md. App. 212, 230-33, 649 A2d 24, 32-34 (1994) (agreeing with 
the trial court that the recipient spouse is not required to act contrary to the 
best interests of her child in order to be self supporting); Cheryl Lynn Hepfer 
& Sherri Beth Ginsburg, Alimony Update, MD. BAR]', Mar./Apr. 1995, at 27,28 
("The legislative intent regarding these factors is to cause the courts to focus 
on the rehabilitation of the financially dependent spouse rather than simply 
to assume that the financially dependent spouse is entitled to indefinite ali-
mony."); Kathryn Lego Arminger, Note, Antenuptial Agreements Waiving Alimony 
A1l1 Not Void Per Se: Frey v. Frey, 298 Md. 552, 471 A.2d 705 (1984), 14 U. BALT. 
L. REv. 200 (1984) (discussing the validity of antenuptial agreements waiving 
alimony). 
67. Indefinite alimony, awarded on a case by case basis, is a form of alimony in-
tended to prevent gross disparities in the income levels of the parties that will 
never be alleviated. See Tracey v. Tracey, 328 Md. 380, 393, 614 A.2d 590, 597 
(1992) (28% disparity), cm. granted, 325 Md. 551, 601 A.2d 1114 (1992), re-
scinded on other grounds, 328 Md. 380, 614 A.2d 590 (1992); Crabill v. Crabill, 
119 Md. App. 249,266-67, 704 A2d 532, 54~1 (1998); Caldwell v. Caldwell, 
103 Md. App 452,464, 653 A2d 994, 1000 (1995) (43% disparity); Blaine v. 
Blaine, 97 Md. App. 689, 708, 632 A2d 191, 200 (1993) (23% disparity). See 
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Temporary alimony, or alimony pendente lite,68 refers to the type 
of alimony a court may grant to provide a spouse with financial suI>" 
port in the interim between filing for divorce and final adjudication 
of the suit.69 In order to award temporary alimony, Maryland law re-
quires proof of a marriage, a pending divorce, proof of a financial 
need on the part of one party, and the ability to pay on the part of 
the other.70 The amount of temporary alimony awarded, however, is 
not considered in the subsequent award of statutory alimony.71 
Statutory alimony refers to the codification of various factors 
Maryland courts must consider in order to award alimony for a 
fixed period of time.72 The principal purpose of statutory alimony is 
rehabilitation - to provide a recipient spouse with the opportunity 
to become financially self-supportive.73 Before awarding statutory ali-
mony, a trial court must consider the twelve factors set forth in sec-
tion 11-106(b) of the Family Law Article.74 While a court is not re-
quired to articulate a reason for its decisions regarding each of 
these twelve factors, it is required to clearly indicate that it has con-
MD. CODE ANN .. FAM. LAw, § 11-106(c) (1991), which provides: 
The court may award alimony for an indefinite period, if the court 
finds that: (I) due to age, illness, infirmity or disability, the party 
seeking alimony cannot reasonably be expected to make substantial 
progress toward becoming self-supporting; or (2) even after the party 
seeking alimony will have made as much progress toward becoming 
self-supporting as can reasonably be expected, the respective stan-
dards of living of the parties will be unconscionably disparate. 
[d. (emphasis added). 
68. See FADER & GILBERT, supra note 28, § 4-5, at 133 (citing BLACK'S LAw DICTION-
ARY 1020 (5th ed. 1979». 
69. See supra note 65. 
70. See FADER & GILBERT, supra note 28, § 4-5(c)-(d), at 135-36. The decision to 
offset financial need and ability to pay is "based primarily on considerations 
of the reasonable needs of the recipient spouse, balanced against the other 
spouse's ability to pay." [d. at 136 (quoting James v. James, 96 Md. App. 439, 
450-55,625 A.2d 381, 38fr89 (1993) (citing Maynard v. Maynard, 42 Md. App. 
47,51, 399 A.2d 900, 902 (1979»). 
71. See id. at 134 (citing Maynard, 42 Md. App. at 52-53, 399 A.2d at 902-03). 
72. See MD. CoDE ANN .. FAM. LAw, § ll-I06(b)(I)-(12) (1998) (listing twelve factors 
a court must consider in awarding alimony). For a recitation of the twelve fac-
tors upon which an original grant of alimony is based, see supra note 66. 
73. See Holston v. Holston, 58 Md. App. 308, 321, 473 A.2d 459, 465 (1984) (com-
menting that the primary function of alimony is rehabilitation) superceded by 
statute on other grounds as explored in Quinn v. Quinn, 83 Md. App. 460, 465 n.4, 
575 A.2d 764, 766 n.4 (1990). For a discussion of rehabilitation as the primary 
purpose of alimony in Maryland, see supra note 59 and accompanying texL 
74. See supra note 66. 
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sidered each factor in arriving at the amount awarded.7s 
The third type of alimony granted in Maryland, indefinite ali-
mony, is a monetary payment to a dependent spouse which may 
continue indefinitely.76 Indefinite alimony may only be awarded 
when, by reason of age or infirmity, a party seeking alimony will 
never become self-supportive, or when after becoming self-
supportive, the standard of living between the two divorcing parties 
will be "unconscionably disparate."77 
With the creation of statutory alimony in 1980, indefinite ali-
mony has become an exception to the norm.7S While Maryland's 
statutory regime for alimony takes a hybrid approach accepting 
both the goal of rehabilitation and the idea that certain circum-
stances call for an indefinite award the rehabilitation rationale has 
achieved primacy.79 Nevertheless, alimony awards that extend over 
years of the parties' lives persist.so As the parties reach retirement 
age, courts have been forced to revisit these indefinite alimony 
awards as both the recipient and payor spouse alter their financial 
circumstances creating scenarios that may warrant modification of 
alimony payments. 
75. See Doser v. Doser, 106 Md. App. 329, 356, 664 A.2d 453, 466-67 (1995) (ob-
serving that the court must indicate that all factors were considered in the de-
cision-making process, but formalistic language need not be used with respect 
to the decision regarding each factor); Hollander v. Hollander, 89 Md. App. 
156, 176, 597 A.2d 1012, 1022 (1991) (noting that the trial judge "is not re-
quired to use a formal 'checklist' but may declare an award for alimony in any 
way that shows consideration of the necessary factors"); Mount v. Mount, 59 
Md. App. 538, 552, 476 A.2d 1175, 1182 (1984) (declaring that the court is re-
quired to "consider all relevant factors, including [twelve] specific factors as 
required by the Maryland statute"). 
76. See MD. CODE ANN .. FAM. LAw § 11-106(c) (1998) ("The court may award ali-
mony for an indefinite period .... "); supra note 62. 
77. MD. CoDE ANN .. FAM. LAw § 11-106(c); see also Rock v. Rock, 86 Md. App. 598, 
609, 587 A.2d 1133, 1138 (1991) (noting that indefinite alimony may be 
granted when it is impractical to expect a spouse to become self-supportive, or 
when alimony for a limited period would result in gross inequity); Rosenberg 
v. Rosenberg, 64 Md. App. 487, 531-32, 497 A.2d 485, 507 (1985) (holding that 
a wife of 30 years who possesses no specialized skills is unlikely to obtain a 
standard of living comparable to the one she enjoyed during marriage and 
any temporary alimony award would make the future standard of living of the 
parties unconscionably disparate). 
78. See FADER & GILBERT, supra note 28, § 4-8, at 165. 
79. For a discussion of Maryland courts' preference for rehabilitative, rather than 
indefinite, alimony awards, see supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text. 
80. See infra notes 81-257 and accompanying text. 
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III. MODIFYING ALIMONY 
In Maryland, section 11-107 of the Family Law ArticleS1 permits 
a court to modify an alimony award originally granted under sec-
tion 11-106.82 A court is authorized to modify an award by either ex-
tending the period for which alimony is awarded83 or by modifying 
the amount of the award.84 Either type of modification requires a 
change in one or both of the parties' circumstances.8s 
Once an alimony award has been granted, it is critical for the 
practitioner to understand the factual circumstances courts have ac-
cepted to justify modifying alimony awards. The following section 
reviews the standard for modifying alimony in Maryland, changed 
circumstances,86 and discusses arguments considered both by Mary-
land and other state courts. 
A. Changed Circumstances 
It is well established in Maryland that alimony awards are sub-
81. See MD. CoDE ANN., FAM. LAw § 11-107. The statute states the following: 
(a) Extension of period. - Subject to § 8-103 of this article, the court 
may extend the period for which alimony is awarded, if: (1) circum-
stances arise during the period that would lead to a harsh and ineq-
uitable result without an extension; and (2) the recipient petitions 
for an extension during the period. (b) Modification of amount. - Sub-
ject to § 8-103 of this article and on the petition of either party, the 
court may modify the amount of alimony awarded as circumstances 
and justice require. 
[d. 
82. See id. 
83. See id. § 11-107(a). 
84. See id. § 11-107(b). 
85. See Blaine v. Blaine, 336 Md. 49, 64, 646 A2d 413, 420 (1993); see also Brodak v. 
Brodak, 294 Md. 10,29,447 A2d 847, 856 (1982); Gamer v. Gamer, 257 Md. 
723, 727-28, 264 A2d 858, 860 (1970); Benkin v. Benkin, 71 Md. App. 191, 
207-08,524 A2d 789, 797 (1986); Lott v. Lott, 17 Md. App. 440, 444,302 A2d 
666, 668 (1973); Verges v. Verges, 13 Md. App. 608, 615, 284 A2d 451, 454 
(1971). 
86. See MD. CoDE ANN .. FAM. LAw § 11-107(b). Some states, however, have adopted 
a much more restrictive standard that must be met before alimony wi\l be 
modified. See Scott Bassett, Changing Circumstances, Changing Agreements: Stan-
dards f(J'( Modification ani Uniform, but how the Courts Apply Them Varies, 8 FAM. 
Aovoc. 29, 29 (1986). For example, Arizona, lIIinois, Kentucky, and Montana 
require a party to show that it would be unconscionable to continue the origi-
nal award based on the change in circumstances. See id. On the other hand, 
Massachusetts is one of the few states that allow automatic modification of ali-
mony awards based on an increase in the payor spouse's income. See Wooters 
v. Wooters, 677 N.E.2d 704, 705-06 (Mass. App. Ct. 1997). 
208 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 28 
ject to reVISIon based on a change in circumstances.87 Indeed, al-
most every jurisdiction in the United States permits its courts to 
modify alimony awards when a party can demonstrate a change in 
circumstance.88 In Maryland, an award of alimony is subject to mod-
ification "upon the motion of either party. "89 The proponent of 
modification "must show a change in circumstances either with re-
spect to the [spouse's] ability to pay support or in the [dependant 
spouse's] need for support or both."90 What amounts to a substan-
87. See Jensen v. Jensen, 103 Md. App. 678, 689, 645 A.2d 914, 920 (1995) (con-
cluding that a recipient spouse was entitled to reinstatement of an alimony 
award based on a change in circumstances). The change in circumstances 
standard is well-documented in Maryland jurisprudence. See Stansbury v. Stans-
bury, 223 Md. 475, 477, 164 A.2d 877, 878 (1960) (noting that a material 
change in circumstances justifies a modification of alimony); Warren v. War-
ren, 218 Md. 212,217, 146 A.2d 34, 37 (1958) (holding that remarriage with-
out further evidence of a substantive change in payor's financial position pro-
vided insufficient grounds for modification); Langrell v. Langrell, 145 Md. 
340,344, 125 A. 695, 697 (1924) (declaring that without a finding of materially 
different circumstances a petition for a reduction in alimony should not have 
been granted); Young v. Young, I 61 Md. App. 103, 112, 484 A.2d 1054, 1059 
(1984) (citing Brodak, 294 Md. at 10, 447 A.2d at 847) (declaring that the reo-
cipient spouse has the burden of proving a change in circumstance at time 
modification is sought); Cole v. Cole,44 Md. App. 935, 939, 409 A.2d 734, 738 
(1979) (observing that a material change in circumstances justifies a modifica-
tion of alimony); Meyer v. Meyer, 41 Md. App. 13, 18, 394 A.2d 1220, 1223 
(1978) (noting that "[s]ubstantial changes in needs, financial conditions, and 
circumstances" may justify modification or termination of alimony); cf Garner, 
257 Md. at 728, 264 A.2d at 860 (holding, in an appeal from a divorce decree, 
that a modification in alimony may be warranted when the payor is no longer 
paying recipient spouse's expenses at a mental institution); Gebhard v. Geb-
hard, 253 Md. 125, l31, 252 A.2d 171, 174 (1969) (declaring, in an appeal 
from a divorce decree, that an alimony decree is subject to modification as 
circumstances change); Moore v. Moore, 218 Md. 218, 221, 145 A.2d 764, 765 
(1958) (noting, in the context of temporary alimony modification, a change 
in circumstances could supply grounds for modification); Lopez v. Lopez, 206 
Md. 509, 520, 112 A.2d 466, 471 (1955) (observing, in an appeal from a di-
vorce decree, that alimony may be modified upward in light of discovery that 
payor's income warrants such revision). But see Lott, 17 Md. App. at 444, 302 
A.2d at 668-69 (holding that modification upward of alimony payments was 
proper even though court found recipient's needs had not substantially 
changed). 
88. See Bassett, supra note 86, at 29. Forty-six jurisdictions in the United States 
have statutory provisions authorizing the modification of alimony under 
changed circumstances. See ill. at 29-31. 
89. 8A MARYLAND LAw ENCYCLOPEDIA § 178 (1985). 
90. Meredith v. Meredith, 614 A.2d 920, 921-22 (D.C. 1992) (quoting A1ibrando v. 
A1ibrando, 375 A.2d 9, 15 (D.C. 1977». A court may increase or reduce a sup-
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tial91 change is left to the discretion of the court.92 
1. Changed Circumstances Cases in Maryland 
In reviewing whether a recipient's alimony award should be in-
creased in relation to the circumstances of the parties, Maryland 
courts will consider such factors as the physical condition of the 
parties, their ability to work, station in life, and each spouse's wealth 
and earning capacity.93 Maryland courts have provided examples of 
situations that satisfy the requisite change in circumstances needed 
to increase a recipient spouse's alimony award.94 For example, an in-
crease has been granted when there was a showing of a substantial 
increase in the payor spouse's income,95 and also when the recipient 
port obligation when there is a showing of a change in circumstances justify-
ing modification. See Gamer, 257 Md. at 728, 264 A2d at 860 (stating that ali-
mony modification may be warranted when the payor spouse is no longer 
paying the recipient spouse's expenses at a mental institution); Crandall v. 
Crandall, 14 Md. App. 476, 480, 287 A2d 326, 328 (1972) (noting that alimony 
awards are never permanent because if the circumstances change, then the 
awards are subject to modification); Verges, 13 Md. App. at 613-15, 284 A2d at 
453-54 (holding that, based on the change in circumstances, alimony modifi-
cation was warranted because payor spouse was in failing health and de-
creased his work hours). In Lott, 17 Md. App. at 440, 302 A.2d at 666, the 
Court of Special Appeals of Maryland addressed the question of whether a 
substantial change in the payor spouse's income was sufficient to warrant 
modification of the alimony award. See id. at 447, 302 A2d at 670. The court 
held that the change in the payor spouse's earnings alone was sufficient to in-
crease the recipient spouse's alimony subsidy, regardless of the recipient 
spouse's financial situation. See id. at 447-48, 302 A2d at 670-71. The court ex-
plained that it is not necessary for both parties to undergo a change in cir-
cumstances, because a change in the situation of one of the parties is bound 
to affect the other party in one way or another. See id. at 445, 302 A2d at 669. 
91. It should be noted that Maryland courts have alternatively used substantial, 
material, or no term at all to modify the change in circumstance standard. See 
supra note 86 and accompanying text. 
92. See Lott, 17 Md. App. at 447, 302 A2d at 670. 
93. See Brodak v. Brodak, 294 Md. 10, 28, 447 A2d 847, 856 (1982) (holding that a 
court should also consider the length of time the parties lived together, cir-
cumstances leading to divorce, and fault); Lott, 17 Md. App. at 450, 320 A2d 
at 671-72 (observing that a court should also consider the recipient spouse's 
assets and income). 
94. See Blaine v. Blaine, 336 Md. 49, 80, 646 A2d 413, 428 (1994) (holding that the 
recipient spouse's failure to obtain a degree was sufficient to modify alimony); 
Lott, 17 Md. App. at 447, 302 A.2d at 670 (holding that a substantial increase 
in the payor spouse's income was sufficient to justify an increase in alimony). 
95. See Lott, 17 Md. App. at 447, 302 A2d at 670 (holding that an increase in the 
payor spouse's income is, in some cases, sufficient to justify an increase in the 
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spouse made as much economic progress as possible, but failed to 
achieve the court's expectations from when it initially granted the 
award.96 Alternatively, when the payor spouse remarries and conse-
quently incurs greater financial responsibilities, a payor spouse may 
assert that the change in circumstances should be considered in 
support of a petition to reduce the alimony payments.97 Numerous 
reasons exist that do not warrant modifying an alimony award at all. 
For example, the unchaste conduct of a spouse98 and a spouse's 
abuse of alcohol99 have been deemed inadequate to justify a change 
in the amount of support payments. lOO 
Practitioners should be prepared to address complicated factual 
situations in which the ideals underlying rehabilitation may be aban-
doned by a court. Such a situation arose in the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland's decision in Blaine v. Blaine. 101 The Blaine case involved a 
request for alimony modification under section 11-107 (a) of the 
Family Law Article,I02 which permits a court to extend the period of 
time for which alimony payments must be made when "'circum-
stances arise during the period that would lead to a harsh and ineq-
uitable result without an extension."'103 Mrs. Blaine had been 
awarded rehabilitative alimonyl04 based on the assumption that by 
amount of alimony paid whether or not the recipient spouse's needs have 
changed). 
96. See Blaine, 336 Md. at 74-75, 646 A.2d at 425 (holding that the recipient 
spouse's failure to achieve a degree contemplated at the time of divorce and 
the subsequent failure to gain employment constituted a change in circum-
stances sufficient to warrant modification of the divorce decree). For a further 
discussion of Blaine, see infra notes lOl-12 and accompanying text. 
97. See Lott, 17 Md. App. at 449, 302 A.2d at 671. 
98. See Meyer v. Meyer, 41 Md. App. 13, 21, 394 A2d 1220, 1224 (1978) (holding 
that the recipient spouse's alimony award was not subject to reduction be-
cause of her unchaste conduct subsequent to divorce). 
99. See Roberts v. Roberts, 35 Md. App. 497, 506, 371 A2d 689, 694 (1977) (hold-
ing that alcoholism is not considered "flagrant misconduct" justifying the re-
duction of alimony). 
100. See Meyer, 41 Md. App. at 21, 394 A2d at 1224; Roberts, 35 Md. App. at 506, 371 
A2d at 694. 
lO1. 336 Md. 49, 646 A2d 413 (1994). 
lO2. See supra note 81 and accompanying text. 
lO3. Blaine, 336 Md. at 56, 646 A2d at 416 (quoting MD. CoDE ANN., FAM. LAw § 
1I-107(a) (1991». Dr. Blaine's income increased substantially in the years af-
ter the divorce, while Mrs. Blaine continued to experience financial difficul-
ties. See itt. at 58, 646 A2d at 417. 
104. For a discussion of rehabilitative alimony, see supra notes 59-60 and accompa-
nying text. 
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obtaining a professional degree, she would eventually increase her 
earnings and eliminate her need for support payments. lOS However, 
as the fIxed period of time during which she would receive support 
approached its end,l06 it became apparent that Mrs. Blaine would 
not attain the level of income anticipated at the time of divorce. I07 
The domestic relations master recommended extending Mr. Blaine's 
obligation to pay alimony for an indefInite period. I08 The trial court 
affirmed the master's recommendation and the court of special ap-
peals upheld the ruling. 109 The court of appeals concluded that Mrs. 
Blaine's situation, coupled with a failing job market, satisfIed the 
requisite change in circumstances and awarded her indefinite 
alimony. I 10 
Arguably, the incentive to become self-supporting after divorce 
is diminished when a court provides indefInite alimony to those 
who fail to achieve their fInancial goals. 11I Although the recipient 
spouse would retain the burden of proving that efforts had been 
made toward becoming self-supporting, a mere showing of a goo<;l 
faith attempt may oblige a payor spouse to continue alimony pay-
ments indefInitely.1I2 Though the Blaine decision must be limited to 
105. See Blaine, 336 Md. at 57-58, 646 A.2d at 417. 
106. The initial award of alimony was $800 per month for five years. See ill. at 58, 
646 A.2d at 417. 
107. See id. at 58-59, 646 A.2d at 417. Mrs. Blaine had hoped that after receiving 
her master's degree, she would be able to earn an annual salary of approxi-
mately $40,000. See id. at 58,646 A.2d at 417. However, an economic recession 
caused the narrow field she was attempting to enter to become static. See id. at 
59, 646 A.2d at 417. Furthermore, her degree was not the equivalent of a 
Master of Social Work, which further limited her ability to branch out into 
teaching or psychological treatment. See ill. These factors caused her to reex-
amine her financial status and conclude that termination of rehabilitative ali-
mony payments would impair her unstable economic status. See ill. at 58-59, 
646 A.2d at 417-18. 
108. See ill. at 60, 646 A.2d at 418. 
109. See ill. 
110. See ill. at 75-76, 646 A.2d at 425-26; see also Tracey v. Tracey, 89 Md. App. 701, 
708-12, 599 A.2d 856, 860-61 (1991) (holding that the recipient spouse was 
entitled to indefinite alimony when it was shown that her income from two 
jobs was equal to only one-third of her former spouse's sole source of in-
come), cert. granted, 325 Md. 551, 601 A.2d 1114 (1992), TlIScinded on other 
grounds, 328 Md. 380, 614 A.2d 590 (1992). 
Ill. See Hepfer & Ginsburg, supra note 66, at 32. 
112. See ill. In their analysis, Hepfer and Ginsburg refer to the dissenting opinion 
by Judge Bell, in Blaine, that attacked the majority's reasoning. See id. Judge 
Bell asserted that a trial judge could, as a result of the majority's decision, 
award indefinite alimony "if the payor former spouse were to hit the lottery, 
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its facts, it provides significant commentary as to both the funda-
mental nature of support obligations and the level of judicial discre-
tion exercised by Maryland courts. 
2. Can Retirement of the Payor Result in Changed Circumstances? 
There are several cases that deal with the elements necessary 
for altering an alimony award for the benefit of the recipient 
spouse. ll3 However, little attention has been given to the hardship a 
payor spouse must endure throughout that spouse's lifetime.1I4 Al-
though alimony is no longer considered a lifetime pension for the 
payee spouse, lIS there appears to be little support for modifying or 
terminating the payor spouse's obligation.1I6 One scenario that ap-
pears to be gaining acceptance by courts outside Maryland arises 
when the payor spouse retires. The next section discusses how other 
jurisdictions deal with retirement as a factor in alimony modifica-
tion cases. In Maryland, however, the effect of retirement on a peti-
tion to modify alimony has never been addressed. 117 
a. Voluntary Retirement as a Factor in Alimony Modification Cases 
A number of jurisdictions have addressed the issue of whether 
voluntary retirement is a valid reason to reduce alimony pay-
ments. lIs Some have concluded that voluntary retirement may con-
settle a lawsuit involving personal injury resulting from an accident occurring 
subsequent to the divorce, inherit funds after the divorce, or, as in this case, 
increase his or her earnings significantly." Blaine, 336 Md. at 83, 646 A.2d at 
430 (Bell, J., dissenting). 
113. See supra notes 93-101 and accompanying text. 
114. See Blaine, 336 Md. at 83, 646 A.2d at 430 (1994) (Bell, J., dissenting) (arguing 
that payor spouse is giving a lifetime pension to dependent spouse); Warren v. 
Warren, 218 Md. 212, 216, 146 A.2d 34, 3fr37 (1958) (noting that changed fi-
nancial or other conditions of the payor spouse such as a new wife or birth of 
a child was not a sufficient cause for reduction of alimony to the first wife). 
115. See Holston v. Holston, 58 Md. App. 308, 321,473 A.2d 459, 46~6 (1984). 
116. See supra note 114 and accompanying text. 
117. For a discussion of income imputed to a retired payor spouse in the modifica-
tion of an initial grant of alimony in Maryland, see infra notes 13&-50 and ac-
companying text. 
118. See Swayze v. Swayze, 408 A.2d 1,8 (Conn. 1978) (noting that early retirement 
constituted changed circumstances and warranted modification in alimony 
payments); Pimm v. Pimm, 601 So. 2d 534 (Fla. 1992) (noting that voluntary 
retirement was a factor to be considered in modifying alimony obligation); 
Silvan v. Sylvan, 632 A.2d 528, 530 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993) (" [G]ood 
faith retirement at age sixty-five may constitute changed circumstances for 
purposes of modification of alimony."). 
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stitute a change of circumstances sufficient to reduce alimony pay-
ments.Jl9 Other courts have held that an early or voluntary 
retirement does not rise to the level of a change in circumstances 
and have elected to impute income to the payor spouse. 120 
In Pimm v. Pimm, 12 I the Supreme Court of Florida addressed 
whether a husband's retirement constituted a change of circum-
stances that would justify reducing his alimony payments. 122 Answer-
ing in the affirmative, the court concluded that the retirement need 
only be reasonable. 123 In assessing reasonableness, the court consid-
ered "the payor's age, health, and motivation for retirement, as well 
as the type of work the payor performs and the age at which others 
engaged in that line of work normally retire."124 The court observed 
that sixty-five years of age is widely accepted as the normal age of 
retirementl25 and that an individual voluntarily retiring before that 
age would face a "substantial burden" in demonstrating that the re-
tirement was reasonable. l26 However, even when a payor reaches age 
119. See, e.g., In m Marriage of Schrimpf, 687 N.E.2d 171, 175 (Ill. Ct. App. 1997) 
(setting forth factors, among them retirement, to be considered in determin-
ing whether a reduction in alimony is appropriate); Haslam v. Haslam, 657 
P.2d 757, 758 (Utah 1982) (relying upon the payor spouse's retirement as well 
as other factors in finding changed circumstances). 
120. See, e.g., In m Marriage of Stephenson, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 8, 14-15 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1995) (providing that a court may impute income to a payor spouse who 
elects early retirement); Leslie v. Leslie, 827 S.W.2d 180, 183 (Mo. 1992) (stat-
ing that voluntary loss of employment is not the type of circumstances that al-
lows for a modification of alimony); Stubblebine v. Stubblebine, 473 S.E.2d 72, 
74 (Va. Ct. App. 1996) (imputing income when the payor spouse had made an 
employment decision to the detriment of the recipient spouse). 
121. 601 So. 2d 534 (Fla. 1992). 
122. See ilL at 535. 
123. See ilL at 537. 
124. Id. 
125. See ilL The court declared: 
The age of sixty-five years has become the traditional and· presumJr 
tive age of retirement for American workers: many pension benefits 
maximize at the age of sixty-five; taxpayers receive an additional fed-
eral tax credit at the age of sixty-five in recognition of the reduced 
income which accompanies retirement; under the Social Security Act 
the definition of "retirement age" includes "65 years of age"; and the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 defines "normal 
retirement age" as including the "time a plan participant attains age 
65." 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
126. Id. 
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sixty-five, retirement does not become presumptively reasonable.127 
Instead, a "court should consider the needs of the receiving spouse 
and the impact a termination or reduction of alimony would have 
on him or her." 128 Other courts have also found that voluntary re-
tirement may amount to a sufficient change of circumstances, but 
have emphasized principles of equity in reaching their result. 
In Misinonile v. Misinonile,129 the Appellate Court of Connecticut 
held that voluntary retirement could offer a sufficient basis for find-
ing a substantial change of circumstances. no Reviewing the trial re-
cord, the court emphasized that the payor spouse, who had retired 
at sixty-eight, had not done so to avoid or reduce his alimony pay-
ments. l3l The Misinonile court emphasized that the payor spouse 
could have retired six years earlier and that he had health 
problems.132 The COl,lrt concluded that "[ u] nder the circumstances, 
it [was] not unreasonable for the defendant ... to be 'tired' and to 
seek the less strenuous and demanding lifestyle offered by 
retirement." 133 
However, as Smith v. Smithl34 makes clear, a payor spouse needs 
to do more than simply invoke the magic word "retirement."135 In 
Smith, the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine held that the payor 
spouse, in using the word "retirement" to describe his voluntary de-
parture from employment and subsequent decrease in income, was 
not given a preferred statUS. I36 Nonetheless, the court acknowledged 
the weight to be given to such factors as the age and health of the 
parties, the circumstances of estrangement, and their station in life, 
concluding that the payor spouse, a sixty-four-year-old doctor in fail-
ing health, was entitled to a reduction in alimony payments. 137 
127. See id. 
128. Id.; see also Deegan v. Deegan, 603 A.2d 542, 546 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
1992) (holding that a trial court must determine "whether the advantage to 
the retiring spouse substantially outweighs the disadvantage to the [recipient] 
spouse"). 
129. 645 A2d 1024 (Conn. Ct. App. 1994). 
130. See id. at 1026. 
131. See id. at 1027. 
132. See id. 
133. Id. 
134. 419 A2d 1035 (Me. 1980). 
135. See ill. at 1038. 
136. See ill. (quoting In re Marriage of Smith, 396 N.E.2d 859, 863 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1979». 
137. See id. at 1039. 
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Numerous jurisdictions impute income to a payor spouse when 
the payor spouse undertakes an act that results in reduction or loss 
of income.138 In Leslie v. Leslie,139 the former husband sought modifi-
cation of his alimony based on the fact that his retirement resulted 
in a reduced income}40 The husband claimed that his employer 
planned to layoff his work shift and that his retirement was there-
fore involuntary. 141 The Supreme Court of Missouri found the hus-
band's argument on this point unpersuasive}42 Rather, the court 
surmised that the husband's actions were voluntary}43 
Looking to prior case law, the Leslie court stated the general 
rule in Missouri that "a voluntary loss of employment is not a sulr 
stantial and continuing change of circumstances such as to allow 
modification. "144 The rule operates even when an individual's deci-
sion to retire is coaxed by rumors of imminent layoffs. 14S Accord-
ingly, when a payor spouse elects to retire, income can be imputed 
to the spouse "according to the spouse's ability to earn by using his 
or her best efforts to gain employment suitable to the spouse's 
capabilities. "146 
Another case emphasizing the payor spouse's earning capacity 
138. See, e.g., Grady v. Grady, 747 S.W.2d 77, 78 (Ark. 1988) (finding that a court, 
in proper circumstances, may impute income to a spouse according to what 
could be earned by the use of best efforts to gain employment suitable to the 
payor spouse's ability); Cohen v. Cohen, 76 Cal. Rptr. 2d 866, 870 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1998) (holding that when the ability and opportunity to work are pres-
ent, earning capacity may properly be imputed for purposes of calculating 
child or spousal support even if the party lacks willingness to find more lucra-
tive work). 
139. 827 S.W.2d 180 (Mo. 1992). 
140. See ilL at 183. 
141. See ilL 
142. See ilL The trial court record reflected that Mr. Leslie could have transferred 
to another shift or plant, and that he in fact continued to work for his em-
ployer after retirement so that he could train his replacemenL See ilL 
143. See ilL 
144. Id. (citing Hughes v. Hughes, 761 S.W.2d 274, 277 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988); Over-
street v. Overstreet, 693 S.W.2d 242, 245 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985); Foster v. Foster, 
537 S.W.2d 833, 836 (Mo. CL App. 1976». 
145. See ilL 
146. Id. (citing Hughes, 761 S.W.2d at 276; Klinge v. Klinge, 554 S.W.2d 474, 476 
(Mo. Ct.· App. 1977». The Hughes court emphasized that it is the payor 
spouse's "past, present, and anticipated earning capacity [that] serve[s] as com-
petent evidence of [the spouse's] ability to pay the amounts awarded." Hughes, 
761 S.W.2d at 276. 
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is In re Marriage of Stephenson,147 in which the Court of Appeals of 
California articulated an "earning capacity" rule in the language 
that follows: 
[W] here the supporting spouse elects to retire early and to 
not seek reasonably remunerative employment available 
under the circumstances, then the court can properly im-
pute income to that supporting spouse given that spouse's 
obligation to p~ovide support and the general notion a sup-
porting spouse must make reasonable efforts to obtain em-
ployment which would generate a reasonable income under 
the circumstances to meet a continuing support 
obligation. 148 
Noteworthy is the court's admonition that a payor spouse, who 
is of retirement age, need not feel compelled to work just to main-
tain his alimony obligation.149 Rather, a court must take into consid-
eration "the totality of the surrounding circumstances unique to 
each individual case, including earning capacity. "ISO 
Though not addressed in the alimony modification context, re-
cently at issue in a Maryland case was the effect of retirement of the 
payor spouse in an initial grant of alimony. In Crabill v. Crabill, lSI 
the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland addressed the issue of 
whether income should be imputed to a payor spouse who retired 
at the age of fifty-three based on past earnings as a part-time 
painter. IS2 After hearing expert testimony regarding a painter's po-
tential earning capacity, the domestic relations master imputed the 
supplemental income to the payor spouse. IS3 Although affirming the 
master's recommendation, the trial judge reduced the amount. IS4 
In an unsuccessful attempt to argue that it was "improper for a 
court to impute income to a voluntarily retired person,"ISS Crabill 
failed to cite Maryland authority, relying instead on Commonwealth v. 
147. 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 8 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995). 
148. [d. at 14. 
149. See id. at 15 n.4. 
150. [d. 
151. 119 Md. App. 249, 704 A.2d 532 (1998). 
152. See id. at 252, 704 A.2d at 533. The court reviewed the original action for abso-
lute divorce, alimony, and child support. See id. The payor had retired from 
his employment with the District of Columbia Fire Department. See iii. at 255, 
704 A.2d at 535. 
153. See id. at 257; 704 A.2d at 536. 
154. See id. at 262, 704 A.2d at 538. 
155. [d. 
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RosS.156 The court of special appeals distinguished the two cases on 
several grounds. 157 The payor spouse in Ross was sixty-five years of 
age and in poor health,158 whereas Crabill was considerably younger 
and in good health. 159 The parties in Ross had lived together after 
the payor spouse had retired,l60 while the Crabills had not. 161 The 
Ross court observed that "when retirement reduces the income of 
the couple, the wife who subsequently leaves the marital domicile 
cannot be expected to be restored to the standard of living she en-
joyed while her husband was working."I62 Although seemingly inap-
posite in most respects, the Crabill court nonetheless found that Ross 
actually supported the imputing of income under Mr. Crabill's cir-
cumstances and affirmed the lower court's ruling. 163 
While Crahilfs application to alimony modification may be 
strained, it does provide two guideposts for the practitioner. First, 
the Crabill court emphasized that the husband in Ross was sixty-five 
years old. l64 Second, the court clearly took into consideration the 
health of the payor spouse. 165 Thus, it appears as though Maryland 
courts are likely to give weight to a payor spouse's overall physical 
capacity in ruling on a modification petition. Courts in jurisdictions 
outside Maryland have also stressed the importance of the payor 
spouse's physical capacity.l66 
h. Diminished Physical Capacity of Payor Spouse 
When a serious health problem impedes the payor spouse's 
ability to pay alimony, a court may modify the payment amount. 167 
156. 213 A2d 135 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1965). 
157. See Crabill, 119 Md. App. at 262-63, 704 A2d at 538-39. 
158. See id. at 262, 704 A2d at 538 (citation omitted). 
159. See id. at 263, 704 A2d at 539. 
160. See id. at 262, 704 A2d at 538 (citation omitted). 
161. See id. at 263, 704 A2d at 539. 
162. Id. at 262, 704 A2d at 538-39 (citing Commonwealth v. Ross, 213 A2d 135, 
138 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1965». 
163. See id. at 263, 704 A2d at 539. The court observed that, "[the trial court] is 
not restricted by the actual income of the husband, but may take into consid-
eration his assets, earning capacity and other attendant circumstances." Id. 
(quoting Ross, 213 A2d at 137). 
164. See id. at 262, 704 A2d at 538; see also Pimm v. Pimm, 601 So. 2d 534, 537 (Fla. 
1992) (noting that "[t]he age of sixty-five years has become the traditional 
and presumptive age of retirement for American workers"). 
165. See Crabill, 119 Md. App. at 262, 704 A2d at 538. 
166. See infra notes 167-77 and accompanying text. 
167. See Hampton v. Hampton, 720 So. 2d 949, 952 (Ala. Civ. App. 1998) (holding 
that a stroke causing brain damage suffered by a payor spouse constituted a 
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In Hampton v. Hampton,168 the Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama 
held that the payor spouse's stroke, causing brain damage, consti-
tuted a material change in circumstances that warranted the trial 
court to reduce the amount of his alimony payments. l69 The Hamp-
ton court considered "such factors as the recipient spouse's financial 
needs, the amount of the estate of each spouse, the ability of the 
payor spouse to respond to the recipient spouse's needs, the ability 
of each spouse to earn income, and the remarriage of either party" 
in determining whether it was appropriate to reduce the former 
husband's alimony payments. 170 The court also noted that the bur-
den of proving that a sufficient change in circumstances had oc-
curred was on the party attempting to modify the alimony award.17J 
While it has been established that physical deterioration, failing 
health, and age may constitute grounds for modifying alimony pay-
ments, these circumstances do not guarantee modification. 172 For 
example, in Sifers v. Sifers,173 the Missouri Court of Appeals held that 
material change in circumstances warranting modification of alimony); Swayze 
v. Swayze, 408 A.2d 1, 8 (Conn. 1978) (holding that the trial court properly 
modified alimony payments by the payor spouse due to changed circum-
stances as a result of severe and debilitating medical problems); Bronson v. 
Bronson, 471 A.2d 977, 979 (Conn. App. Ct. 1984) (finding a substantial 
change in circumstances warranted alimony modification when a payor 
spouse's physical disability arose after the original alimony decree); In 111 Mar-
riage of Charles J. Columbo, 555 N.E.2d 56, 57 (Ill. Ct. App. 1990) (stating 
that a payor spouse's retirement, three months prior to his sixty-fifth birthday 
due to a heart condition, was a substantial change in circum-stances warrant-
ing modification of alimony); see also 24 AM. JUR. 2D Divorce and Separation §§ 
827-28 (1998) (discussing changes in the financial circumstances of a payor 
spouse which warranted modification of alimony payments). 
168. 720 So. 2d 949 (Ala. Civ. App. 1998). 
169. See itl. at 952. 
170. Id. (citing Swain v. Swain, 660 So. 2d 1356 (Ala. Civ. App. 1995». 
171. See itl. 
172. See Silver v. Silver, 113 So. 2d 921, 923-24 (Ala. 1959) (holding that a payor 
spouse's physical condition did not warrant modification of alimony); Gal-
ligher v. GaJligher, 527 So. 2d 858, 860-61 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (holding 
that the payor's physical condition that inhibited his ability to work overtime 
did not warrant reduction in alimony payments); Sifers v. Sifers, 544 S.W.2d 
269 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976) (holding that modification was unwarranted when 
husband failed to demonstrate that he was in poor health or unable to obtain 
employment after losing his job); Saul v. Saul, 107 A.2d 182, 183-84 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1954) (holding that the payor spouse's heart attack and hospital 
stay did not constitute a change in circumstances warranting modification be-
cause his earning capacity had not been substantially reduced). 
173. 544 S.W.2d 269 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976). 
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a sixty-two-year-old man who was unable to continue working in his 
. usual capacityl74 had not sustained the burden of establishing a 
change in circumstances sufficient to justify reducing his support 
obligations.17s The court based its conclusion on the payor spouse's 
lack of evidence demonstrating a physical inability to work in other 
fields of employment. 176 Under the court's reasoning, the payor 
spouse had to prove ail inability to work in any other capacity and 
provide evidence that his voluntary election to retire was not an at-
tempt to escape his support obligations.177 Thus, Sifers illustrates a 
subjective element courts often consider in deciding whether to 
modify an alimony award-the payor's motivation for retiring. 
c. Good Faith Retirement 
Some jurisdictions focus on whether a payor spouse's voluntary 
decision to retire is made in good faith. In these jurisdictions, good 
faith is an important consideration when deciding whether to per-
mit or deny an alimony reduction based on a payor spouse's retire-
ment. 178 Generally, a self-imposed decrease in or cessation of in-
come of a payor spouse for the purpose of avoiding an alimony 
obligation does not constitute a material change in circumstances 
that would justify reducing alimony payments. 179 However, when a 
174. See ilL at 269-70. The payor spouse had undergone treatment for a malignant 
kidney, because of which he had lost his job. See id. 
175. See ilL 
176. See id. at 270. The payor spouse had worked in various positions in the choc<T 
late industry. See id. He had applied for employment only within that field. See 
id. 
177. See ill.; see also Saul, 107 A.2d at 183-84 (finding that the payor spouse's 
changed circumstances were insufficient to warrant modification when it ap-
peared that he deliberately changed his circumstances to avoid support obliga-
tions). 
178. See Tydings v. Tydings, 349 A2d 462, 464 (D.C. Ct. App. 1975) (holding that a 
payor spouse's decision to voluntarily retire, absent a substantial showing of 
good faith, did not constitute a change of circumstances warranting a modifi-
cation of alimony); see also McFadden v. McFadden, 563 A2d 180, 183 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1989) (McEwen,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (con-
tending that voluntary retirement constitutes a change in circumstances for 
purposes of modifying alimony decrees without determining whether retire-
ment was made in good faith); cf. Silvan v. Sylvan, 632 A.2d 528, 530 (NJ. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993) (concluding that good faith retirement at age sixty-
five may constitute a change in circumstances warranting a modification in ali-
mony payments). 
179. See Tydings, 349 A2d at 463; Blowitz v. Blowitz, 221 N.E.2d 160, 164 (Ill. Ct. 
App. 1966); Crosby v. Crosby, 29 S.E.2d 241, 243 (Va. 1944); Lambert v. Lam-
ben, 403 P.2d 664, 667-68 (Wash. 1965). For a discussion of voluntary retire-
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payor spouse has retired in good faith, and not for the purpose of 
avoiding an alimony obligation, retirement may satisfy the material 
change in circumstances requirement and result in alimony 
reductions. ISO 
In Silvan v. Sylvan, 18 I the payor spouse retired at the age of 
sixty-three and one-half years and sought reduction of alimony.182 
The trial court denied a motion for modification. 183 Reversing the 
trial court, the Superior Court of New Jersey concluded the "moti-
vation which led to the decision to retire" was one of several consid-
erations that suggested the need for reduction in alimony 
payments. 184 
Similarly, in McFadden v. McFadden,185 the Superior Court of 
Pennsylvania held that changed financial circumstances caused by a 
payor spouse's voluntary retirement should be considered when as-
sessing a petition for alimony modification. 186 Noting that the 
master specifically found that the retirement was in "good faith,"I87 
the court reasoned that if the parties had not divorced, and if the 
payor spouse had planned to retire at a certain age, the recipient 
spouse could not have complained that the household income 
would have been reduced by the payor spouse's retirement. 188 
Therefore, if a retirement after divorce is made in good faith, and 
not in an effort to avoid legal obligations, an alimony recipient 
should have no greater claim than if no divorce had taken place. 189 
The dissent in McFadden asserted that the payor spouse's volun-
tary retirement did not constitute a material change in circum-
ment as grounds for modification of alimony, see supra notes 118-50 and ac-
companying text. 
180. See Misinonile v. Misinonile, 645 A.2d 1024, 1027 (Conn. App. Ct. 1994); 
Silvan, 632 A.2d at 530. 
181. 632 A.2d 528 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993). 
182. See ill. at 529. 
183. See id. By the time the appellate court affirmed the trial court's denial of the 
husband's motion for modification, the husband had turned sixty-five. See ill. 
He then renewed his motion, which was again denied, leading to this opinion. 
See ill. 
184. See ill. at 530. A court should consider whether the retirement was reasonable 
under all of the circumstances, or whether it was primarily motivated by the 
payor spouse's desire to reduce his alimony payments. See ill.' 
185. 563 A.2d 180 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989). 
186. See ill. at 183. 
187. See ill. at 183 n.3. 
188. See ill. 
189. See ill. 
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stances warranting modification. l90 The dissent pointed out that if 
the parties had intended the husband's planned retirement at sixty-
five to constitute a material change in circumstances, that intent 
should have been expressed in the alimony agreement since the 
planned retirement was only five years away at the time of the di-
vorce. 191 Nevertheless, the majority declared that alimony awards 
"need not reflect all contingencies,"192 likening the payor's retire-
ment to death or disability.193 Moreover, it is important to note that 
the majority did not hold that the husband was automatically enti-
tled to a reduction in his alimony payment; rather, the court held 
that the lower court should have held an evidentiary hearing on 
whether a modification was warranted after considering the 
changed financial circumstances caused by the payor spouse's volun-
tary retirement. 194 
Minnesota shares the view that" [i]f the [retirement] was made 
in good faith, [the recipient spouse and child] should share in the 
hardship as they would have had the parties remained together."195 
The Court of Appeals of Minnesota remanded In re Marriage of Rich-
ards196 to the lower court to determine the payor spouse's motiva-
tion for retirement. 197 The court explained that if the lower court 
found that the husband retired in good faith, Minnesota case law 
authorizing alimony reductions after voluntary retirement would 
control. 198 However, if the lower court found that the payor spouse 
acted in bad faith to limit his income, case law precluded reducing 
alimony payments. l99 The Richards court further directed the trial 
court to consider the payor spouse's "health and employment his-
190. See ill. at 184. 
191. See ill. (McEwan,j., concurring in part and dissenting in part). For additional 
information on the role of agreements in the modification of alimony awards, 
see supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
192. Id. at 183 (citing Teribery v. Teribery, 516 A.2d 33, 37-38 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1986». 
193. See #d. 
194. See McFadden, 563 A.2d at 183. Compare 23 PA CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3701 (West 
1999) (setting forth seventeen factors for consideration in an alimony award), 
with MD. CODE ANN .. FAM. LAw § 11-I06(b) (1998) (outlining twelve factors 
courts are required to consider when making alimony awards). 
195. Geisner v. Geisner, 319 N.W.2d 718, 720 (Minn. 1982); see also In re Marriage 
of Richards, 472 N.W.2d 162, 164-65 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991). 
196. 472 N.W.2d 162 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991). 
197. See ill. at 165. 
198. See ill. 
199. See ill. 
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tory, the availability of and expectations regarding early retirement 
at the time of divorce, and the prevailing managerial policies and 
economic conditions present at the time of retirement, together 
with whatever subjective reasons the obligor may offer."200 
While it may seem that good faith often supports a reduction 
in alimony or, at least, that courts encourage fact-finding on the is-
sue of a payor spouse's motivation for voluntary retirement, practi-
tioners should be prepared to address the following argument: a 
payor spouse simply does "not have the right to divest himself of his 
earning ability at the expense of [his former spouse and 
children] . "201 
In re Marriage of IZo,ilO2 involved a payor spouse who entered 
medical school after his divorce rather than continuing his employ-
ment.203 Petitioning the court to modify his alimony obligation to 
the income of a full-time student,204 the payor spouse argued that 
his earning capacity should not be considered, instead the focus 
should be on his actual earnings.2os The reasoning was that earning 
capacity should only be considered when the court finds that the 
payor has acted deliberately to reduce his income in order to avoid 
his support obligations.206 However, the court held that while the 
payor spouse was free to pursue a medical degree, he was not free 
to abandon his responsibilities to his former spouse and children.2OO 
The court asserted "that a finding of good faith [does not] pre-
200. Id. These factors were applied in Minnesota in a subsequent case. See Walker 
v. Walker, 553 N.W.2d 90, 95 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996) (finding that a fifty-nine-
year~ld husband did not act in bad faith when he did not seek employment 
after being fired from his job). 
201. In n1 Marriage of Ilas, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 345, 350 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (holding 
that earning capacity of a former husband could be considered even in ab-
sence of deliberate attempt to refuse to maintain or seek employment). 
202. 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 345 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993). 
203. See id. at 346-47. 
204. See id. 
205. See id. at 347. 
206. See ill. at 347-48 (quoting Philbin v. Philbin, 96 Cal. Rptr. 408 (Cal. App. 3d 
1971) ("'The rule [that alimony may be based on earning capacity rather than 
actual earnings] seems to be applied only when it appears from the record 
that there is a deliberate attempt on the part of the husband to avoid his fi-
nancial responsibilities. "'»; see also In n1 Marriage .of Meegan, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
799 (1992) (holding that a payor spouse who quit a high-paying job to enter a 
monastery acted in good faith and had his alimony obligation reduced to 
zero). 
207. See In n1 Marriage of Ilas, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 350. 
1998] Petitioning to Modify Alimony 223 
vent[] use of the earning capacity standard. "208 Thus, the payor's 
motivation209 in quitting his job and entering medical school was 
not dispositive.2lo Instead, the court imputed the payor spouse's 
earning capacity to him as actual income.211 
The concept of good faith has enjoyed significant consideration 
in the arena of alimony modification after retirement. Lawyers in 
the area should discern the motivation of the retiree and recognize 
factual circumstances in which those motivations may affect a 
court's treatment of voluntary retirement as constituting a change 
in circumstances warranting a modification of alimony.212 Although 
Maryland's statutory provisions provide little guidance in assessing 
what should constitute a sufficient change in circumstances, the 
multi-factor framework established for assessing an initial award 
lends support for adopting a more elaborate balancing approach as 
illustrated in the Section that follows. 
d. Balancing Approach: Weighing the Advantage to the Payor Spouse 
Against the Detriment to the Recipient Spouse 
As any change in an alimony award will simultaneously affect 
the payor and recipient, it is necessary to determine the impact that 
modification of support payments will have on both parties. For ex-
ample, in Dilger v. Dilger,213 the Superior Court of New Jersey ad-
dressed the issue of early retirement and the termination of ali-
mony payments based on a change in circumstances.214 The payor 
spouse elected early retirement and subsequently stopped making 
alimony payments to the recipient without providing any notice.21S 
208. ld. For a discussion of the judicial practice of imputing of income after con-
sidering earning capacity, see supra notes 138-50 and accompanying text. 
209. The payor argued that "a lifelong dream of attending medical school" moti-
vated his action. lias, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 348. 
210. See ill. 
211. See ill. at 350. 
212. For a discussion of the theory of voluntary impoverishment as it relates to ali-
mony modification, see supra notes 238-57 and accompanying text. 
213. 576 A2d 951 (NJ. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1990). 
214. See ill. at 952. Earning approximately $85,000-$90,000 annually at the time of 
this case, the payor spouse elected to retire early from a job with the New 
York Stock Exchange. See id. at 952-53. In preparation for retirement, the 
payor purchased an eighty-six-acre farm in Pennsylvania. See id. at 953. 
215. See ill. Mrs. Dilger, who earned approximately $18,000 annually from her em-
ployment position with Citibank, was forced to use funds from a personal in-
jury action to payoff the balance of her mortgage, and was additionally bur-
dened by her son who suffered from black lung disease and was not entirely 
self-sufficient. See ill. 
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As a result, the recipient spouse faced a foreclosure due to an in-
ability to comply with monthly mortgage payments.216 
In analyzing the payor spouse's cross-motion to terminate ali-
mony payments, the court declared: "that a better approach in as-
sessing whether early retirement constitutes a change of circum-
stances is to inquire not only as to whether the retirement was in 
good faith but also whether, in light of all the surrounding circum-
stances, it was reasonable for the supporting former spouse to elect 
early retirement."217 The factors relevant to this inquiry were '"the 
age, health of the party, his motives in retiring, the timing of the 
retirement, his ability to pay maintenance even after retirement and 
the ability of the other spouse to provide for himself or herself."'218 
Based on these factors, the court concluded that the payor spouse's 
voluntary retirement "was neither in good faith nor, under the cir-
cumstances, otherwise reasonable. "219 As a result, his retirement 
constituted "self-induced 'changed circumstances'" and any modifi-
cation of his support obligation was improper.220 
After the decision in Dilger, the Superior Court of New Jersey 
clarified and supplemented the Dilger analyses in Deegan v. Deegan.221 
In Deegan, the payor spouse voluntarily retired at age sixty-one, after 
forty-two years of employment as a steamfitter, and moved for an or-
der terminating alimony.222 The trial court denied his application to 
terminate alimony.223 
On appeal, the superior court noted that when a change in cir-
cumstances is involuntary, all a court must consider is the financial 
216. See itl. 
217. It!.. at 955. 
218. It!.. (quoting In re Marriage of Smith, 396 N.E.2d 859, 863 (1\1. App. 3d 1979». 
Other significant factors were "the reasonable expectations of the parties at 
the time of the agreement, evidence bearing on whether the supporting 
spouse was planning retirement at a particular age, and the opportunity given 
to the dependent spouse to prepare to live on the reduced support." It!.. 
219. Id. 
220. Id. at 956. 
221. See Deegan v. Deegan, 603 A.2d 542, 546 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992) (ex-
plaining that deciding whether a spouse may voluntarily retire "will depend 
on the individual circumstances of a particular case"). 
222. See it!.. at 543. 
223. See it!.. The trial court observed: 
It!.. 
He's been in the labor market for forty-two years. He is a healthy in-
dividual. There's no allegations that he is in bad health. So he does 
have the ability. He'll just have to go out and find a job to generate 
the income. So his application to terminate alimony will be denied. 
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situations of the parties.224 However, a voluntary change in circum-
stances required a two-step analysis.22S First, the court must deter-
mine whether the payor spouse has retired in good faith and the re-
tirement was reasonable.226 If the court answers in the negative, the 
analysis ends.227 However, if the answer is in the affirmative, the 
court must decide "whether the advantage to the retiring spouse 
substantially outweighs the disadvantage to the payee spouse. "228 If 
this advantage to the retiring spouse does substantially outweigh the 
disadvantage to the payee, the retirement will be deemed a legiti-
mate change in circumstances warranting a modification.229 The 
court reversed and remanded the case for a review of the facts in 
light of the standards the court set forth.230 
Florida has established an approach similar to the approach 
crafted by the Deegan court. In Pimm v. Pimm, 231 the Supreme Court 
of Florida acknowledged that although sixty-five may be viewed as 
the median retirement age, not every payor spouse should be per-
mitted to conclude a legal support obligation through retirement.232 
224. See id.; see also Epstein v. Epstein, 656 A.2d 707, 710 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1994) 
(holding that a payor spouse's involuntary dismissal from his job was a sub-
stantial change in circumstances that supported the termination of alimony 
payments). 
225. See Deegan, 603 A.2d at 546. 
226. See id. at 544-45. 
227. See Dilger v. Dilger, 576 A.2d 951, 956 (NJ. Sup. Ct. 1990). 
228. Deegan, 603 A.2d at 546. The court continued its analysis by observing that 
when a party's basis for retiring is premised upon health concerns and the 
detriment to the recipient spouse is simultaneously minimal, the balance will 
swing to the favor of the payor spouse. See id. Conversely, when a desire to 
create a new lifestyle free of past obligations fuels the payor spouse's retire-
ment and such a change in circumstances leaves the recipient spouse in a det-
rimental financial position, the balancing test will undoubtedly find in favor of 
the recipient spouse. See id. 
229. See itt. The court further commented: 
[d. 
Thus, where a payor spouse has substantial reasons for retiring (i.e., 
health concerns) and the effect on the [recipient] spouse is minimal 
(due for example, to other available income, qualifying for social ge.. 
curity, or new employment) the balance will be struck in favor of the 
payor. Where, on the other hand, the payor spouse simply wants a 
new life and the [recipient] spouse will become destitute without 
support, the [recipient's] interests will prevail. 
230. See id. at 546-47. 
231. 601 So. 2d 534 (Fla. 1992). 
232. See id. at 537 ("Based upon this widespread acceptance of sixty-five as the nor-
mal retirement age, we find that one would have a significant burden to show 
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The court must consider "the needs of the receiving spouse and the 
impact the termination or reduction of alimony would have on him 
or her" in reaching a decision as to terminate or reduce a support 
obligation.233 
With this framework established, the Deegan test has served as 
an analytical foundation for one other jurisdiction faced with this 
unsettled issue. In Barbarine v. Barbarine,234 the Court of Appeals of 
Kentucky adopted this test. Following the analysis set forth in Dee-
gan, the court found that the seventy-year-old recipient spouse with 
a meager monthly income from social security benefits would be 
unable to support herself if alimony support payments were re-
duced.23s There was no evidence presented tending to show that the 
husband was forced to retire or that he was in poor health.236 
Adopting the balancing test of Deegan, the Court of Appeals of Ken-
tucky found that the detriment to the payee spouse outweighed the 
benefits to the payor and consequently denied the husband's re-
quested modification of alimony.237 
e. Voluntary Impoverishment 
Another factor which may be considered by a court in assessing 
whether to grant a modification of alimony is voluntary impoverish-
ment.238 Voluntary impoverishment occurs when a payor spouse has 
voluntarily abandoned well-paying employment for a lower paying 
position or has otherwise taken steps to purposely deplete his finan-
cial resources.239 Courts in jurisdictions throughout the nation have 
that a voluntary retirement before the age of sixty-five is reasonable.") 
233. Id. 
234. 925 S.W.2d 831 (Ky. Ct. App. 1996). 
235. See id. The court concluded that the payor spouse knew of his former spouse's 
financial situation at the time of his decision and her social security benefits 
provided her sole income. See id. In addition, the court examined his decision 
not to receive social security payments until reaching the age of sixty-five to 
obtain a higher payment. See id. The court specifically cited the Deegan factors 
and balancing test. See id. at 833. 
236. See id. 
237. See id. 
238. See Smith v. Smith, 419 A.2d 1035, 1038 (Me. 1980) (holding that the trial 
court did not abuse its discretion in reducing the payor spouse's alimony pay-
ments by only $50, even though his income dropped from $29,000 to $7,000 
after retirement). 
239. See id. at 1038. An additional definition is provided in American Jurispru-
dence, which explains voluntary impoverishment as follows: 
Where the obligor spouse has voluntarily relinquished a well-paying 
practice and has taken a position at modest salary the court may base 
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held voluntary reduction of income does not constitute valid 
grounds to modify an alimony award.240 
In Tydings v. Tydings,241 the District of Columbia Court of Ap-
peals held that a payor spouse was not entitled to a modification of 
alimony payments due to the fact that his decrease in income was 
self-induced.242 In Tydings, a fifty-five-year-old payor spouse opted for 
early retirement, even though he suffered no physical or psychologi-
cal impairments.243 Based on this change in circumstances, the 
payor spouse petitioned the court to reduce the amount of alimony 
he was paying his ex-wife.244 The trial court denied his petition on 
the grounds that the change was insufficient to warrant modifica-
tion.24S The appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision stating 
"voluntary reduction in income or self-imposed curtailment of earn-
ing capacity, absent a substantial showing of good faith, will not 
the amount of alimony on capacity to earn money, or on prospective 
earnings. Though an award of alimony may be based on ability to 
earn as distinguished from actual income, the rule is applied only 
when it appears from the record that there is a deliberate attempt on 
the part of the obligor spouse to avoid family responsibilities by re-
fusing to seek or accept gainful employment, willfully refusing to se-
cure or take a job, deliberately not making application to business, 
intentionally depressing income to an artificial low, or intentionally 
leaving employment to go into another business. 
24 AM. JUR. 20 Divorce and Separation § 662 (2d ed. 1983). 
240. See Gerlach v. Gerlach, 267 N.W.2d 149, 150 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978) (conclud-
ing that a payor spouse's unemployment was self-imposed and rejecting the 
payor's claim of changed circumstances sufficient to warrant reduction of ali-
mony); Bradley v. Bradley, 880 S.W.2d 376, 379 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994) (holding 
that a reduction in income, resulting from the payor spouse's voluntary retire-
ment was not reason enough to warrant reduction in his alimony payments); 
Pope v. Pope, 559 N.W.2d 192, 196 (Neb. 1997) (finding that a payor spouse's 
termination from employment for falling asleep at his desk did not constitute 
adequate cause to justify modification of his alimony obligation); Fleischmann 
v. Fleischmann, 601 N.Y.S.2d 16, 16 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993) (rejecting payor 
spouse's request for modification of alimony due to the fact that his reduced 
earnings were attributable to his voluntary decision to accept less lucrative em-
ployment); Herndon v. Herndon, 305 N.W.2d 917, 918 (S.D. 1981) (citing Sim-
mons v. Simmons, 290 N.W.2d 319 (S.D. 1940» (finding that a "person cannot 
voluntarily reduce his income in order to avoid alimony and support pay-
ments"). 
241. 349 A.2d 462 (D.C. 1975). 
242. See id. at 464. In Tydings, the payor spouse's decrease in income was based on 
his election to voluntarily retire. See id. 
243. See id. at 463. 
244. See id. 
245. See id. 
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constitute such a change of circumstances as to warrant a 
modification. "246 
The issue of volun tary im poverishmen t was addressed by the 
Court of Special Appeals of Maryland in the context of an initial ali-
monyaward in Colburn v. Colburn.247 In Colburn, a husband appealed 
a trial court's award of alimony to his wife on the grounds that his 
potential income was considered in computing the alimony amount, 
rather that the amount of income he was actuaUy receiving at the 
time of the divorce.248 The court found that the husband's retire-
ment at the age of fifty-one, his surrendering of a lucrative salary, 
and his act of transferring all of his stock to his nephew pending 
the divorce constituted voluntary impoverishment and made his cur-
rent income invalid for determining an alimony amount.249 
In 1992, the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, in John O. v. 
Jane 0.,250 enunciated a clear set of factors to be considered in de-
termining whether parties to a divorce proceeding had voluntarily 
impoverished themselves.251 Although John O. addressed voluntary 
impoverishment in the child support context, the court of special 
appeals subsequently adopted the same factors in the alimony set-
ting in Guarino v. Guarino.252 
In Guarino, the court of special appeals addressed whether a re-
cipient spouse had voluntarily impoverished herself and the effect 
such a finding would have on her eligibility for temporary ali-
246. [d. at 464. 
247. 15 Md. App. 503, 292 A.2d 121 (1972) (noting that when a spouse voluntarily 
impoverished himself, income and capital holdings prior to such acts could be 
considered in determining an alimony award). 
248. See id. at 504, 292 A.2d at 123. 
249. See id. at 515-16, 292 A2d at 128-29. 
250. 90 Md. App. 406, 601 A.2d 149 (1992) (remanding for a determination of 
whether the payor spouse had voluntarily impoverished hi~elf based on enu-
merated factors). 
251. See id. at 421, 601 A2d at 156 (setting out factors to be considered in deter-
mining whether a party is voluntarily impoverished, including the following: 
current physical condition, level of education, timing of any change in em-
ployment or other financial circumstances relative to the divorce proceedings, 
the relationship between the parties before the divorce proceedings, the ef-
forts made to find and retain work, whether the party has ever withheld sup-
port, past work history, the area in which the parties live and the status of the 
job market there, and any other considerations presented by the parties). 
252. 112 Md. App. I, 6, 684 A2d 23, 25-26 (1996) (holding that the same factors 
used in analyzing child support voluntary impoverishment cases should be ap-
plicable in determining pendente lite alimony awards). 
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mony.2S3 In appealing the award for temporary alimony, the payor 
spouse argued that his wife was voluntarily impoverishing herself be-
cause she was capable of contributing to her own support.2S4 The 
Guarino court concluded, however, based on the evidence and after 
considering the ten factors set out in John 0., that the wife had not 
voluntarily impoverished herself and was indeed eligible for alimony 
pendente lite.2S5 In so concluding, the court cited its prior use of the 
John O. factors in Colburn within the alimony context.256 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland has yet to address the issue 
of voluntary impoverishment in the specific context of alimony 
modification. However, it can be inferred from the Colburn and 
Guarino decisions, both in the initial granting of temporary and stat-
utory alimony, that the Maryland courts may apply the concept of 
voluntary impoverishment to deny a former spouse's petition for 
modification of alimony payments.2S7 
IV. TERMINATION OF ALIMONY 
In Maryland, petitions to terminate alimony are governed by 
statute.2S8 Specifically, section 11-108 of the Family Law Article lists 
three occurrences that permit a court to terminate alimony. Ali-
mony may terminate upon the death of either party,2S9 remarriage 
of the payee spouse,260 and when harsh and inequitable results 
253. See ill. at 3, 684 A.2d at 24. 
254. See ill. at 1, 684 A.2d at 23. 
255. See ill. at 15, 684 A.2d at 30. 
256. See ill. at 15 n.4, 684 A.2d at 30 n.4. 
257. See generaUy Colburn v. Colburn, 15 Md. App. 503, 514-15, 292 A.2d 121, 128 
(1972) (quoting 24 AM. JUR. 20 Divorce and Separation § 622 (2d ed. 1983» 
(finding, prior to the enactment of § 12-201 (b)(2) , that "where the husband 
has voluntarily relinquished a well-paying practice and has taken a position at 
a modest salary the court may base the amount of alimony upon his capacity 
to earn money, or upon his prospective earnings"); Quinn v. Quinn, 11 Md. 
App. 638, 643, 276 A.2d 425, 427 (1971) (holding that it is the party's overall 
financial ability to support and not merely the party's current income which 
controls the amount of alimony awarded). 
258. See MD. CODE ANN .. FAM. LAw § 11-108 (1998) (providing that, unless the par-
ties agree otherwise, alimony terminates on the death of a party, the remar-
riage of the recipient, or if a court determines that termination is necessary to 
avoid a harsh and inequitable result). 
259. See ill. § 11-108(1). 
260. See ill. § 11-108(2). Also, alimony has been held to terminate when reconcilia-
tion between the spouses results in their sharing a residence. See McCaddin v. 
McCaddin, 116 Md. 567, 574, 82 A.2d 554, 557 (1911) ("[I]f the wife returns 
to her husband after a divorce a mensa et thcmJ, and is reconciled with him, she 
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would otherwise occur if the payor spouse was forced to continue 
making payments.261 
The rationale that underlies terminating alimony payments 
when either party dies is clear.262 The death of a party would render 
payment or receipt of alimony impossible. The reasoning for termi-
nating alimony when the recipient spouse remarries is also well-
supported.263 In years past, the wife had a generally accepted right 
to be supported by her husband.264 It was presumed that the wife 
was unable to support herself.265 Alimony was ordered to be paid as 
a means of support during a given time period.266 When the wife, 
and now the wife or husband remarries, alimony payments will ter-
minate because the spouse has gained support from another 
source.267 
However, the purpose underlying the termination of alimony 
payments in order to avoid "harsh and inequitable" results remains 
undeveloped in Maryland case law. On its face, the term "harsh and 
inequitable" is ambiguous. Compounding that problem is the fact 
that the Maryland courts have not addressed the issue of what con-
stitutes "harsh and inequitable." One plausible explanation that 
supports why the legislature drafted the statute using such broad 
language is that it intended for the judiciary to make use of the dis-
cretion that is typically allowed in domestic relations cases generally, 
and matters concerning alimony specifically.268 
The purpose of section 11-107,269 which addresses extending the 
period of alimony and modifying the amount, is "to provide for an 
appropriate degree of spousal support in the form of alimony after 
the dissolution of the marriage. "270 It follows that in some situations, 
namely those mentioned in section 11-108,271 the "appropriate de-
cannot continue to have alimony."). 
261. See MD. CODE ANN .. FAM. LAw § 11-108(3). 
262. See itl. § 11-108 (l) . 
263. See itl. § 11-108(2). 
264. See CLARK, supra note 41, § 14.1, at 420. 
265. See itl. 
266. See McAlear v. McAlear, 298 Md. 320, 331, 469 A2d 1256, 1261 (1984). 
267. See itl. 
268. See Blaine v. Blaine, 336 Md. 49, 66, 646 A2d 413, 421 (1993). 
269. See MD. CODE ANN .. FAM. LAw § 11-107 (1998) (extension of period; modifica-
tion of amount). 
270. Blaine, 336 Md. at 64, 646 A2d at 421 (quoting McAlear, 298 Md. at 348, 469 
A2d at 1256). 
271. That is, the death of either party, remarriage of the recipient, or to avoid a 
harsh and inequitable result. See MD. CoDE ANN .. FAM. LAw § 11-108. 
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gree" may be zero.272 Indeed, if the promotion of equity and fair-
ness constitutes at least some part of the foundation of Maryland 
family law, it may appear troubling that Maryland appellate courts 
have never had an occasion to interpret the "harsh and inequitable 
result" language of section 11-108(3) in a published opinion. One 
reason could be that alimony typically does not need to be termi-
nated because it tends to terminate itself. Alimony may be viewed as 
a continuance of the support to which the wife was entitled under 
the marriage, damages for a breach of the marriage contract, or 
punishment for adultery.273 However, in Maryland, as with many 
other jurisdictions, alimony is viewed most often as "rehabilita-
tive. "274 Alimony in Maryland exists primarily to allow for a reasona-
ble period of time during which the recipient spouse is expected to 
obtain education or training to become self-supporting.27S Thus, ali-
mony often terminates at a definite point that was established in the 
initial alimony proceedings. Other jurisdictions have indicated more 
heightened reluctance to terminate alimony payments than in the 
modification context. 
For example, in McNutt v. McNutt,276 the Court of Civil Appeals 
of Alabama held that the retirement of the payor spouse,277 due to 
degenerative arthritis, did not preclude him from finding other 
forms of employment.278 At trial, the recipient spouse presented evi-
dence that the payor spouse did not always perform manual labor 
in his shop, but rather normally completed paperwork and adminis-
trative duties.279 In response, the payor spouse presented evidence il-
lustrating that he was no longer capable of performing physical 
work, that his condition would worsen over time, and that he had 
272. See II Cal. App. 4th 156 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992). 
273. See ClARK, supra note 41, § 16.1, at 620-21. 
274. See supra notes 53-60 and accompanying text. 
275. See Blaine, 336 Md. at 62, 646 A2d at 419 (explaining the history of Maryland's 
view of alimony). The Governor's Commission on Domestic Relations Laws, 
which submitted the bill that in 1980 became Maryland's alimony statute, pro-
posed this significant change to Maryland's approach to alimony. See ill. The 
bill provided generally for alimony to be awarded for fixed periods, with al-
lowances for extensions in certain situations. See ill. 
276. 593 So. 2d 1032 (Ala. Civ. App. 1992). 
277. The payor spouse worked as a manual laborer in an automobile repair shop. 
See ill. at 1033. 
278. See ill. 
279. See ill. The husband conceded that the shop employees did in fact perform 
physical work in the shop, ranging from welding to painting to transmission 
work. See ill. 
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no marketable skills that would enable him to find sedentary 
employment.280 
The court affirmed the trial court's decision that the payor 
spouse was physically able to continue working in some alternative 
capacity and that the lower court did not abuse its discretion in 
modifying rather than terminating the husband's support pay-
ments.281 The court's decision suggests that a thorough showing of 
complete inability to perform any type of work may be necessary 
before a court will terminate an alimony decree.282 
v. CONCLUSION 
As alimony payments are often the only means of survival for 
the recipient spouse, strict criteria are needed in evaluating a 
party's petition. No Maryland case to date has specifically set a pre-
cedent for terminating alimony payments for reasons other than 
death or remarriage. As a result, it is reasonable to assume that 
most future decisions by Maryland courts will be based on the ana-
lytical framework laid out in cases modifying alimony. Retirement is 
a factor that surfaces repeatedly in alimony modification cases, but 
is not always analyzed in a consistent fashion by each jurisdiction. 
Petitions to modify alimony for changed circumstances due to re-
tirement are likely to surface with greater frequency as the divorce 
rate of couples hovers around fifty percent283 and the percentage of 
American's reaching the age of retirement is expected to increase 
until the year 2030.284 
280. See itt. 
281. See itt. 
282. See itt. In addition to examining the evidence presented, the trial court also 
took into account the demeanor of both witnesses before reaching its conclu-
sion that the husband was still employable. See itt. 
283. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
284. See Jan Ellen Rein, Misinformation and Self-deception in Recent Long-term Care Pol-
icy Trends, 12 J. L. & POL. 195, 207 (1996). One commentator emphasizes 
America's aging population phenomenon as follows: 
Americans age sixty-five and over now outnumber the entire popula-
tion of Canada, and they comprise 12.5% or more of the American 
population, as compared to 4% in 1900. The aging of the baby-boom 
generation, healthier lifestyles, and advances in medical technology 
all have contributed to this explosive growth in the elderly popula-
tion. This increase, described as an "age wave," will not begin to de-
cline until the year 2030. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
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Retirement, in good faith, is accepted in some jurisdictions as a 
sufficient change in circumstances to warrant modification of ali-
mony.28S On the other hand, many other jurisdictions do not con-
sider retirement grounds for modifying an award.286 Instead, they 
look to any alternate income potential or earning capacity to sustain 
the original award.287 Although voluntary retirement at an advanced 
age does not automatically entitle a payor spouse to a reduction in 
alimony payments, it is undeniable, from a social perspective, that 
people plan their lives around the goal of retiring at the approxi-
mate age of sixty-five.288 
Maryland does not have a solid foundation of case law on 
which to analyze the issue of retirement, if it is ever confronted. 
This challenging issue in domestic law yet to be definitively re-
solved, will eventually confront the judiciary, thereby forcing the 
courts to choose which position they will support. The balancing 
test, established by the Deegan court, lays a clear framework for a 
court's analysis and would provide instructive guidance for Mary-
land courts.289 This test appears to allow a court to thoroughly ana-
lyze the i~ue in its attempt to reach a fair and equitable result. 
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285. For a discussion of decisions finding that retirement in good faith warrants a 
modification in spousal support obligations of the payor spouse, see supra 
notes 181-200 and accompanying text. 
286. For a discussion of decisions finding that retirement in and of itself is not a 
sufficient ground to reduce or terminate alimony obligations, see supra notes 
134-50, 200-11 and accompanying text. 
287. For decisions pertaining to earning capacity after retirement as a method for 
calculating reductions or modifications in spousal support obligations, see 
supra notes 138-50 and accompanying text. 
288. See supra note 125 and accompanying text. 
289. For a discussion of the balancing test implemented in the New Jersey decision 
of Deegan v. Deegan, 603 A2d 542 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992), and its sub-
sequent application in other jurisdictions, see supra notes 213-37 and accom-
panying text. 
